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ABSTRACT 
 
"Liberia: Postwar, Not Yet Postcolonial" is a project discussing the ways in 
which, two Liberian presidential candidates (re)construct and perform their socio-
political identities in order to build constituency in the postwar context.  I am mainly 
concerned here with the ways in which Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and George Weah, 
locate themselves in relationship to Liberia’s founding dilemma: the tension between 
the Americo-Liberian minority (Liberian-born descendents of the country’s African 
American “founding fathers”), and the indigenous Liberian majority.  This project 
primarily addresses the 2005 Liberian presidential election as a discrete moment in 
Liberian history.  It also attempts to explain and situate the surprising election of Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf as Liberia’s 24th and first female president, into a national cultural 
context that advantages repatriated Liberian intellectuals and politicians like Johnson 
Sirleaf, while disadvantaging and marginalizing indigenous knowledge and talent. 
By investigating the concept of repatriation, and the political agendas of Johnson 
Sirleaf and Weah, this project explicates the ways in which gender and class privilege 
impact political participation, democratic institutions and political organizations in 
ways that allow historical inequalities to reproduce.  The exclusionary nature of 
politics in Liberia demand that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as the country’s new president, 
encourage a sustained moment of decolonization in order to address major concerns 
related to national identity, reconciliation, reconstruction and postwar recovery.  This 
project challenges the meaning of Johnson Sirleaf’s presidency as a landmark election.  
It also encourages us to think critically about the ways in which repatriation 
contributes to class, gender and educational inequality.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“I thank my Lord the God of Peace.  O He really answers prayers.  Thank God 
the United Nations and Papa Kofi Annan…  Thank God for President Bush, the Peace 
is here forever.  I say one way, one-way ticket to Monrovia.  I’m never coming back.” 
Lyrics by Caroline Barnard 
 
The lyrics to this song, penned by Caroline (C.C.) Barnard in 2004 became 
increasingly popular in the weeks and months leading up to the October 2005 Liberian 
presidential election.  The song’s popularity was due, in part, to its ubiquitous 
presence at Ellen Johnson Sirleaf fundraisers and campaign rallies throughout the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area.  Barnard, a Liberian expatriate living in Maryland, 
just outside the beltway, expressed longing for a last and final return to Liberia, a 
message that resonated with the Liberian community in the United States, of which 
she was a part.  Many of these expatriates fled the country after the 1980 coup d’etat 
when an indigenous leader replaced the Americo-Liberian president.  Johnson Sirleaf 
was the candidate they believed could facilitate this final return.  In this way, it 
became a popular political anthem for Liberians immigrants in the United States, and a 
song that had little or no currency in Liberian capital of Monrovia itself.  At the time, 
with no existing provisions for out-of-country voting, Liberians living in the United 
States struggled to create a direct connection to the political process unfolding in the 
West African Nation.  While many could not return home to cast their vote for 
Johnson Sirleaf, they could still influence the outcome of the election by urging family 
members at home – those often dependent upon their American relatives for income – 
to vote in their stead.  At its peak, the song was an internet sensation and sales of the 
CD catapulted C.C. Barnard into the spotlight; the tune was even featured in a story by 
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the Washington Post about the history-making postwar political transition.  It was, in 
short, a song written by a Liberian expatiate, and consumed in large part by that same 
demographic.  The song expressed feelings of hope, longing, redemption, and above 
all else, repatriation:  these are themes, put to music by Barnard, that have historically 
defined, and resonated with the Liberian elite class.  
The popularity and genesis of the song are not surprising given that ideas of 
displacement, and return are nothing new to Liberia’s “Congo” people.  This ethnic 
group is also known as Americo-Liberians, are the descendents of the African 
American repatriates that founded the country in 1847.  Congos, like the Krio of Sierra 
Leone, are formerly enslaved, African descended peoples, repatriated to the continent 
after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 1807.  Much like the hyphenated 
name of this ethnic identity suggests, Americo-Liberians exists on the boundary 
between Africa and the West.  To use a term coined by Ali Mazrui to describe 
Algeria’s “pied noirs” and South Africa’s “Afrikaners,” they are Africans by adoption, 
but also, by virtue of their African heritage, they are understood additionally as 
Africans “of the blood” (Mazrui, p.11).  
It is largely because Americo-Liberians are Africans “of the blood” that they 
are rarely written about as settlers returning to Africa from the diaspora.  The creation 
of the Liberian state itself was predicated upon the foundation of the Americo-
Liberian leadership and identity, in the Weberian sense, as an elite political class. 
Americo-Liberians began to resettle west Africa beginning in 1822, leaving the United 
States before slavery was abolished and carrying with them the culture of the 
antebellum South.   The settlers, rather than leaving the legacy of slavery and racism 
behind them, recreated the same master – servant system in their new home.  This 
history, and the legacy of the cultural divisions between “western” repatriated and 
indigenous blacks continue to pervade present day society.   It is these questions, 
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concerning what type of Liberian is the “right” type of Liberian that resurfaced during 
the postwar campaign, and subsequent election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. 
The election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia’s first female president, in 
November 2005, provides a unique opportunity to understand the ways in which 
politics and progress are shaped by cultural identity.  Deeply grounded in the 
Americo-Liberian or “Congo” political tradition, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf raises the 
question of whether or not black leadership, particularly, black female leadership is by 
nature, progressive.  What helps to distinguish Americo-Liberians from other Liberian 
ethnic identities is culture, and the ways in which local institutions are constructed in 
order to reproduce that culture and identity.  This study addresses the 2005 
presidential election as a discrete moment in Liberian history where old resentments 
held by indigenous Liberians surfaced and created a counter-narrative to the election 
discourse on postwar reconstruction.  This project rethinks the fundamental problem 
of what constitutes social and cultural progress, asking what type of Liberian is the 
“right” type of Liberian to lead the postwar country?  This study is also an exploration 
of the two archetypal Liberian identities, the “Congo” and the “Country” that from 
different communities and classes in Liberian society is understood as the central 
founding dilemma undermining the stability of the Liberian state.  All of this serves to 
provide a context for understanding what the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf means, 
and how her interventions in the postwar context shape how and in what ways Liberia 
might engage in a sustained process of decolonization.   
That Liberia, whose name means “liberty,” is one of the most unequal societies 
on the African continent is largely a result of traditions and policies begun by the 
country’s founding fathers.  Now that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf sits atop the Liberian 
democracy, one wonders what her role will be in the trajectory of historical progress.  
Will she reproduce the mistakes of Liberia’s past presidents by enacting policies that 
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benefit the leadership, at the expense of the people?  Under the William Tubman and 
William Tolbert regimes, domestic policies failed to decrease the socio-economic gap.  
Tolbert’s government, using a rhetoric that engaged a philosophy of sustainable 
development, coined the terms from “Mat to Mattresses” and “Total Involvement for 
Higher Heights,” to illustrate the importance of improving lives of all Liberians during 
his presidency.  Despite his use of racial uplift rhetoric, his policies did not weaken the 
concentration of power in the hands of just a few dozen families and friends.  Samuel 
Doe, Liberia’s first indigenous president also failed to increase opportunities for 
indigenous Liberians.  His public policy proved only that indigenous Liberians could 
be as corrupt as Americo-Liberians.  During his presidency, largely defined by U.S. 
Cold War policies, he did little or nothing to improve the living conditions of the 
indigenous people.   
Liberia: Postwar, Not Yet Postcolonial, presents a distinct and different way of 
looking at the crisis in Liberia as not a failed, failing or fragile state, but an example of 
bourgeois modern statehood itself.  What can be gained by looking at the 1980 coup 
d’etat as the direct result of indigenous resistance to the 1847 settler intrusion?  How 
does Liberia fit into the broader paradigm of settler statehood presented by British in 
Kenya, French in Algeria, and Afrikaner and British in South Africa?  This study 
interrogates competitive elections as a study in culture and identity.  By comparing 
and contrasting Johnson Sirleaf and George Weah, I look at the ways in which identity 
is constructed in order to build constituency in an election process that includes, print 
news, campaign slogans and radio interviews.  Chapter One offers a discussion of the 
fundamental ways that history can be used to construct political personas.  I look at the 
ways in which Johnson Sirleaf leverages the myth and tradition that Americo-
Liberians, (also known as “Congos”) are natural born leaders in order to advance her 
campaign.  This chapter is an exploration of how these two candidates interact and 
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engage one another in a conversation about culture, identity and the future of the 
Liberian polity.  It also explains how the roots of their two competing views on the 
1980 coup d’etat and how that moment does or does not shape their conceptualization 
of the reconstructed Liberian state. 
In Chapter One, I also address the ways in which George Weah’s campaign 
can be understood in the context of Liberian “strong man” politics.  Mike McGovern 
writes about how “strong man” politics only validate the individual who at the time of 
the vote has the strongest army.  For a country still recovering from the ravages of 
war, George Weah’s core constituency of former child soldiers became a metaphorical 
representation for the use of force and fear to validate illegitimate regimes.  In the 
subtext of the election, Johnson Sirleaf reasserted and carried the mantle of Americo-
Liberian political supremacy.  George Weah attacked the fundamental assumptions 
undergirding Johnson Sirleaf’s campaign with makes an ideological argument, 
critiquing the use of culture to subordinate, marginalize and discredit Liberia’s 
indigenous people.  The force of Weah’s critique is unfortunately overshadowed by 
his own larger-than-life personality and the assertion that he his successful career and 
wealth made him as Liberian royalty, an assertion that his supporters reaffirmed, 
calling him “King George.” 
This project discusses him as a popular, albeit polemical figure.  He 
understands and articulates indigenous Liberian frustration about their political 
disenfranchisement in a unique way, initiating a public discussion about privilege and 
progress.  Unfortunately, it is clear from the outset that Weah’s campaign is predicated 
on his popularity alone.  He does not seriously engage a peace agenda or promote 
reconciliation and harmony among all Liberians.  Instead, he stokes indigenous 
resentment in order to drum up grassroots support for his candidacy, without 
advancing a refined political agenda.  His unbridled machismo is largely responsible 
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for driving away many women voters who comprise the majority of the population and 
were the constitutive majority.  In many ways, the nature of his campaign was a 
complete affront to the Liberian women peacemakers that had played an integral role 
in bringing about the political resolution of the conflict. 
Over the course of the election, Weah raised, but did not answer the question, 
who are the real citizens in Liberia?  George Weah’s embrace of his “Country” 
identity endeared him to many of the country’s disenfranchised youth, who, much like 
him, had been denied opportunities for formal education.  The use of the term 
“Country” is actually a derogatory term denoting all of Liberia’s 16 indigenous ethnic 
groups.  It generally refers to an unassailable indigenous identity unfit for assimilation.  
The divide between the Congo and the Country dates back to the 1822 founding of the 
original settlement and is generally understood to denote colonial exclusion, created 
when the minority settlers monopolized political power claiming that indigenous 
Liberians were too unsophisticated to run the state.  Country people had no rights and 
could be jailed and forced into plantation-style labor by Americo-Liberians.  Country 
people were routinely humiliated, forced to enter Americo-Liberian owned homes and 
government buildings through the back door and even forced to pay a tax to observe 
the proceedings of the legislature.   
By contrast, Americo-Liberians were called “Congos,” owing the term 
“Congo” to a smaller group of Africans that were relocated to Liberia in the 1800s 
after being freed from slave ships.  Congos lived in the homes of Americo-Liberians 
and largely assimilated the culture and social attitudes of Americo-Liberians through 
marriage and adoption.  To native Liberians, both groups were the same.  The name 
“Congo” is derived from the fact that most of them claimed to have originated in areas 
close to the Congo River in central Africa.  The term “Congo” later came to apply to 
both Americo-Liberians and Congo people, connoting their non-native status. 
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Americo-Liberians and Congos, still inhabit areas such as Congo-town in central 
Monrovia where the Congos once formed a self-protective enclave.   
Africans and Westerners alike have hailed Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s election as 
the continent’s first female president a triumph.  It has also been considered the 
beginning of a new type of democratic politics in Liberia.  For the first time in 
Liberian history, women voted in large blocs to elect their next president.  Chapter 
Two entitled, A (Lone)Star Is Born discusses the ways in which the grassroots 
women’s movement in Liberia catapulted Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to electoral success 
during the November 2005 runoff election. In what ways is this election unique or 
exceptional, and how did it represent a break from the past?  How can we understand 
Sirleaf as Liberia’s first female president?  Is she an exception, or is she part of a 
longer history and continuum and female leadership in Liberian society?  I attempt to 
understand and articulate ideas about what tradition of female leadership Sirleaf is 
accessing, indigenous or Americo-Liberian.  I also investigate issues such as the “glass 
ceiling” that forced Sirleaf abroad for continued professional development.  In 
addition, this discussion addresses Sirleaf’s personal narrative as an indigenous 
Liberian, in order to determine how she broke through cultural and gender barriers in 
order to assimilate into the Americo-Liberian political elite in ways that benefitted her 
over the course of the election.   
A (Lone)Star is Born describes how Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia’s “Iron 
Lady” drew much of her political support from women voters and from Liberia’s 
small educated elite.  As a new president, she faced the challenges of rebuilding the 
country as well as fostering a climate of reconciliation.  What began as a grassroots 
anti-rape and anti-war movement spearheaded by a consortium of women’s 
organizations including Liberian Women’s Initiative (L.W.I.), Women in Peace 
Building Network (W.I.P.N.E.T.) and Manor-River Women’s Network 
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(M.A.R.O.P.W.I.P.N.E.T.) created the momentum that propelled her into the 
presidency.  When Johnson Sirleaf, at the advice of her campaign consultant Riva 
Levinson, began to articulate the historical importance of her candidacy, Liberian 
women voters began to rally around her as their candidate.   
During Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s inaugural address on January 16, 2006, she 
clearly articulates an invitation for displaced Liberians to return to Liberia in order to 
lend their talents and professional skills to the reconstruction process.  She has also 
spent a disproportionate amount of time in the United States, greeting her American 
supporters, meeting with American politicians and lecturing at the country’s most 
prestigious universities.  She is by far, one of the most sought after and popular 
African politicians on the continent at this time.  Johnson Sirleaf envisions a 
reconstruction process in Liberia and a development policy in which African 
Americans and Liberian Americans directly invest in and recapitalize the private 
sector.  
Chapter Three, Repatriation as Patriotism, addresses the possibility of ongoing 
and future cultural “clashes” as the Liberian Diaspora return home to work, and 
rebuild, forming a “defacto” new ruling class. Will the members of the Diaspora in 
their return, re-enact the original colonial encounter?  These issues are important in the 
context of the country’s shifting cultural composition, as internally displaced rural 
Liberians living in Monrovia acquire elevated status.  Also of note are is the potential 
for tension between the internally displaced population living in Monrovia and the 
established landowning elite who, encouraged by Johnson Sirleaf’s election, are 
returning from abroad in record number to resettle and claim a stake in the country’s 
economic and political systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHO ARE THE REAL LIBERIANS?  TOWARDS A NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
“So my feet are in two worlds - the world of poor rural women with no respite from 
hardship, and the world of accomplished Liberian professionals, for whom the United 
States is a second and beloved home. I draw strength from both. But most of our 
people have not been as fortunate as I was. Always poor and underdeveloped, Liberia 
is only now emerging from two decades of turmoil that destroyed everything we 
managed to build in a century and a half of independence.”1 
-Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
 
In a crisis-ridden country filled with larger-than-life electoral drama, the 2005 
election contest between Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a politician of World Bank and 
Citibank pedigree, versus her celebrity opponent, George Weah, international 
footballer of AC Milan fame unexpectedly reveals one of the most candid electoral 
discourses ever engaged in the West African nation.  As an adversary, political novice 
though he was, the thirty-nine year old, George Weah proved to be a worthy contender 
in the race for the presidency.  In the mid-1990s, at the peak of his laudable sports 
career, he held the titles, FIFA World Player of the Year, European Footballer of the 
Year, and African Footballer of the Year.  As a Liberian football hero, his global 
stardom, wealth and famous name, made him a favorite among the youth, the postwar 
                                                 
1 Johnson Sirleaf, Ellen.  Transcript from address to U.S. Joint Session of Congress.  March 15, 2006.  
[online] URL available. 
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/content.php?sub=Joint%20Session%20of%20Congress&related=Major%2
0Speeches 
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country’s single-largest constituency.2  Johnson Sirleaf however, a sixty-seven year 
old grandmother and thirty-year veteran of Monrovia politics was also a household 
name.  Although she lacked Weah’s charm and popularity, Johnson Sirleaf was a 
ferocious competitor, a trait, once well known by her prior challengers, that now was 
almost entirely obscured by her graying hair and small stature.  Johnson Sirleaf, a 
thirty-year veteran of Liberian politics, had attempted twice before, but lost both bids 
for the presidency.  These defeats, coupled with her surprising return to politics, added 
an element of drama to a contest and competition between the two candidates that 
turned this election into a legendary matchup.   
Johnson Sirleaf’s presidential ambitions date back to the late 1970s when she 
served as the first female Minister of Finance to William Tolbert, the last Americo-
Liberian oligarch.  During this time, she is suspected to have moonlighted with 
“Movement for Justice in Africa,” of (M.O.J.A.), a group of university students and 
indigenous-Liberian intellectuals, including Amos Sawyer and Togba Tipoteh and 
Gabriel Baccus Matthews who plotted to overthrow the Americo-Liberian-led 
government in 1979.3  Later, in 1985 she campaigned against Tolbert’s assassin turned 
successor, Samuel Doe, the C.I.A.-backed military dictator.  During this 1985 election, 
she survived two imprisonments and a treason trial for her opposition to his 
leadership.   For either the strength of her resolve, or her ability to invoke the 
confluence of international pressure that eventually forced Doe to release her, it was 
this 1985 stint as a political prisoner that earned her the title Liberia’s “Iron Lady.”4  
                                                 
2 The majority of Liberia’s population is under the age of 35 according to UNICEF population statistics. 
3 Mamdani, Mahmood.  Text of talk at the Divestment Teach-In, Columbia University, November 13, 
2002.  Online.  Retrieved April 26, 2009. 
4 “President Doe’s Prisoner” Index on Censorship, Volume 16, Issue 5 p, 11-15,  May 1987  
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With no incumbent president in the race, the 2005 election, would present no 
new threats to physical security for her to overcome.  On a whole the political process 
was devoid of the violence that through of voter intimidation, political imprisonment, 
and ballot theft, had overshadowed the1985 and 1997 elections, distorting its 
outcomes.  The 1997 election of warlord Charles Taylor while “clean,” by 
international standards, was, as Mike McGovern calls, deceiving because it served 
only to validate the nation’s “strong man,” and did not qualify as evidence of vibrant 
of a viable democracy.5  That election proved only that Taylor had the strongest army 
at the time of vote, not that he inspired voter confidence.  When Liberians voted for 
him in 1997, they voted to save their lives: they went to the polls saying, “You killed 
my ma.  You killed my pa.  You will not kill me, I will vote for you.”6  It was Johnson 
Sirleaf’s late 1990s affiliation with Charles Taylor that cast aspersion upon whether or 
not a successful Johnson Sirleaf campaign was feasible at all in the wake of the 2003 
U.N. and U.S.-led military intervention.  After all, it had been her acute political 
ambition that led her to partner with the now infamous Taylor in support his 
insurgency to oust the Doe regime.  During her time as his deputy, she infamously 
sanctioned Taylor’s bloody siege on the Monrovia executive mansion where Doe 
supporters were sheltered - a virtual death sentence to the city’s tenement dwellers - 
saying “level it, and we will rebuild it,”7 a comment for which she later apologized.  
Although Johnson Sirleaf parted with Taylor in the early stages of the war, after he 
“killed two of her friends,”8 the damage to her reputation had already been done; she 
                                                 
5 McGovern, Mike.  Rebuilding a Failed State: Liberia.  Development in Practice, Vol. 15, No. 6 (Nov., 
2005), pp. 760-766 
6 Rice, Andrew.  “George Weah’s New Game.”  New York Times, August 21, 2005 
7 Gbakukenju, Dennis Jah.  “Liberia's ‘spoil it and fix it’ mentality.” May, 2009  online: 
http://dennisjah.blogspot.com/2009/03/liberias-spoil-it-and-fix-it-mentality.html 
8 Anderson, Jon Lee.  “After the Warlords.”  The New Yorker. New York: Mar 27, 2006. Vol. 82, Iss. 6; 
pg. 58 
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lost when she ran against him in 1997, in part because she could levy no moral 
argument against him. For all of these reasons, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf long has, and 
continues to be a dynamic, multifaceted force in the contentious, often-violent world 
of Liberian politics.  
At stake at this point in her career, thrice defeated as a presidential candidate, 
Johnson Sirleaf entered the race with a specific purpose: the 2005 election was 
considered Johnson Sirleaf’s opportunity to censure critics that questioned her 
credibility because of her close ties to Taylor, the country’s most destructive warlord.  
The fight against George Weah was in part, an opportunity to rebut old resentments 
against her and argue that she was not only a part of Liberia’s past, but also its future.  
Major diplomatic professionals and ambassadors found her to be the most palatable 
candidate because of her past success in the world of international business and 
finance.  The process of resurrecting her political career and winning the trust and 
support of Liberians through her political slogans, speeches and campaign rhetoric 
would prove to be one of the most difficult challenges that she had yet faced.  By the 
time of the 2005 campaign, she was already well known as a neoliberal reformer and 
had a reputation as an indefatigable taskmaster.   
Reintroducing herself to the Liberian electorate in August 2005 was a crucial 
process because her personal political narrative, and its evolution, in a sense, had to be 
inspiring in order for her to clarify her dubious history in Liberian politics.  The 
historical nature of the election also demanded that she revisit and redefine her 
political and cultural identity in new and previously unarticulated ways.  She says, 
"People always thought I was Americo-Liberian, until today-it's a political hurdle.  If I 
had not had such a history of political activism, I would never have become 
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President."9  Despite the fact that she professes to maintain the same political agenda 
from the beginning of her political career in the 1970s until now- that of a democratic 
reform-driven activist- many in political circles questioned her dubious political 
affiliations and feared that she would replace “big man” politics with a new woman-
led form of autocracy.  These concerns were largely couched in accusations of her 
Congo-ness given that both Congo people had partnered with Americo-Liberians to 
exploit indigenous Liberians.  Congo men and women, to a large extent, cooperated to 
aggregate power and maintain political and economic control over marginalized 
indigenous or Afro-Liberians. 
Despite the fact that earlier in her career, she had navigated the Americo/ Afro-
Liberian divide by emphasizing that she crossed “both worlds,” in 2005, she would 
finally be forced to articulate a position that rooting her firmly on one or the other side 
of the divide.  If she were to renounce her Americo-Liberian or “Congo” identity, her 
political detractors would call her a hypocrite, largely because she had benefitted from 
a political system that had advantaged her and other indigenous wards of Americo-
Liberian families like her, as a card-carrying member of that particular ethnic identity.  
To embrace her indigenous identity (Johnson Sirleaf is directly descended from two of 
Liberia’s indigenous ethnic groups, the Gola and the Kru), would signify participation 
in a particular political event, one that would bring to light the historical 
marginalization of Liberia’s indigenous people.  It would also give her candidacy new 
meaning, bringing her own historic election into alignment with the presidency of 
Samuel Doe, the country’s first indigenous president.  Never before had a presidential 
candidate engaged these two ideologically opposed identities simultaneously in a 
national election.  The Congo (Americo-Liberian) vs. Country (indigenous and/or 
                                                 
9 Anderson, Jon Lee.  “After the Warlords.” The New Yorker. New York: Mar 27, 2006. Vol. 82, Iss. 6; 
pg. 58 
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Afro-Liberian) divide is widely regarded as Liberia’s most important historic and 
original dilemma.  Resentments over the 133 year disenfranchisement of indigenous 
Liberians by Americo-Liberians is largely considered the cause of the 1980 coup 
d’etat that brought Samuel Doe to power, and responsible for the resulting twenty-
three years of political violence. 
Because Johnson Sirleaf was forced to identify herself as either Congo or 
Country in the post-conflict context, it signaled to Liberian voters that this would be 
an historic election unlike any other.  Johnson Sirleaf had built bridges in the United 
States and with Western institutions that validated her professional skills and 
intellectual capabilities, but those connections did not necessarily endear her to the 
Liberian people.  Her primary identity as a “Western” educated Liberian positions her 
in a “colonial” construct that encourages Western educated elites to dominate Liberian 
politics.  For years, the Americo-Liberian bourgeois landed gentry exploited 
indigenous labor for financial advantage.  Indigenous histories, cultures, talents and 
language had all been subverted by Americo-Liberian colonial domination.  In 1847, 
the year of the country’s founding, instead of taking the opportunity to adopt Vai as 
the Liberian national language (the Vai alphabet dates back to the 1840s), or 
subordinating themselves to the authority local chiefs, Americo-Liberians chose not 
to, because they wanted to be seen as Americans, not Africans.  Americo-Liberians 
introduced Western values, tastes and habits into the new nation and used the power of 
the state to enforce these new conventions.   
It is for all of these reasons that understanding Johnson Sirleaf as a politician 
demands that one explicate and explore the boundaries and the relationship between 
cultural identity and the state.  Johnson Sirleaf wants her political identity to reflect 
Liberia’s future and not its past.  Is she, through her presidency, reflecting the current 
state of Liberian politics, or does she represent the ways in which Western influences 
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can permeate and impact the outcomes of African elections?  Johnson Sirleaf is 
demanding that the West, and the international community in general, restore its 
diplomatic relations with Liberia, ties that were broken under the Taylor regime.  The 
political function of her representation of a bourgeois, “Westernized” identity is a 
signal to western states that the violence in Liberia’s past is behind them and that the 
country is once again, “open for business.”  
In April 2005, Ambassador John Blaney, the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, felt 
compelled to state, as reported in The Analyst, a Monrovia newspaper, that this was 
Liberia’s “last chance” to secure its future.  Blaney, like many others in diplomatic 
circles, expected the October election to send the message that Liberia was 
permanently at peace.  Despite the fact that the message expressed a certain degree of 
optimism, it certainly was more of an ultimatum than a promise of continued financial 
and military support.10  In short, Liberia might not again receive high levels of 
American-led international assistance if the country were to implode again.   Johnson 
Sirleaf’s campaign, leveraged a political perspective, widely supported by Americo-
Liberians, that Liberia’s conflict ridden past was indeed behind them.  This point of 
view was predicated on the belief that saw Doe’s 1980 coup d’etat as the root cause of 
Liberia’s twenty-three years of despotic regimes.  Her campaign advanced the notion 
that it was the failings of Doe’s indigenous-led government, and not ideologically 
driven resentments between indigenous Africans and Americo-Liberian settlers that 
had driven the state to the brink of collapse.  In turn, the George Weah campaign 
agreed that the past 23 years of decline was indeed a hyperbolic form of despotism, 
but argued instead that the fighting resulted from deeply rooted societal divisions.  In 
short, Weah claimed 133 years of despotism, to Johnson Sirleaf’s 23, thus raising the 
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stakes of the political discourse.  To make an argument for 133 years of despotic rule 
is to argue that Liberia was not, and never had been a democratic country, and that 
democracy itself was an American Colonization Society created myth that Liberia, 
meaning “liberty,” was a haven from Western racism.  The conversation about the 
original cause of conflict and the cultural background of the candidates took place on a 
national stage.  For Weah (himself an indigenous Kru), that public discussion was 
critical because the conflict between the native Africans that he symbolically 
represented and African-American settlers who had long been reduced to a one-
dimensional depiction of Samuel Doe’s takeover that ended True Whig Party 
dominance, (in a single party system) and installed a Krahn-led (one of Liberia’s 16 
indigenous ethnic groups) military dictatorship.  The importance of historically 
revisiting and revising the origins of the conflict is essential to any discussion of 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and state recovery.  For Johnson Sirleaf, that discussion 
was particularly dangerous because her own identity and symbolically, her campaign 
itself, had been predicated upon the preservation of certain historical silencing of 
oppositional, radical identities, experiences and mythologies.  George Weah, however, 
foiled Johnson Sirleaf’s efforts to downplay the significance of her Congo privilege 
and he brought to light the processes of assimilation that transformed politicians of 
indigenous blood such as Johnson Sirleaf, into “Congos.”  
Cultural identity is a concept specifically tied to issues of subjectivity and 
representation.  Cultural identity, as Stuart Hall writes, “reflects the common historical 
experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us … with stable, unchanging 
and continuous frames of reference and meaning” (Hall, 223).  Hall traces the 
development of cultural identity and creolization to the post-colonial struggles that 
“have so profoundly shaped our world” (223).  Certainly, the rejection of one identity 
and the assumption of another, more mainstream identity (of which the inverse is also 
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true) can be a signifier of cultural and social change.  Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 
transformation into a Congo person both highlights the socio-cultural violence 
embedded in the perpetuation of this identity through the subordination of indigenous 
Liberians by Congo politicians.  In order to be “Congo,” one must embrace a narrative 
of cultural imperialism that masks and normalizes assimilation as part of Liberia’s 
transition into a modern nation.11  Ellen Johnson Sirleaf rejects the notion that a divide 
between the Congo and indigenous Liberian communities exists at all is her way of 
saying that she is not one of the country’s elite.  She rejects the idea of a class system 
altogether saying, “If such a class existed, it has been obliterated over the last few 
years from intermarriages and social integration.”12  Despite her denials however, the 
name Johnson Sirleaf alone, derives its meaning from a colonial context.  By 
renouncing her indigenous name, Johnson Sirleaf embraces a settler colonial past and 
brings into public view, the ways in which indigenous names, and indigenous 
resistance was suppressed.  
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, born to indigenous parents, had a Gola father and was ¼ 
Kru and ¼ German on her mother’s side.  With no direct Americo-Liberian blood, she 
was, by birth, and by law, an indigenous Liberian.  In the 1930s and 1940s, her father 
Jahmale Johnson, the son of a Gola chief, had given his surname in reverence to 
Hilary Johnson, Liberia’s 9th president.  The president had bestowed the Anglophone 
name upon him, as a reward for his grandfather’s loyalty.  Assuming an Anglophone 
name had many privileges, least of which that Jahmale Johnson was born in Monrovia.  
He was educated by an Americo-Liberian family named McCritty, became a lawyer 
and later served as the first indigenous Liberian in the legislature.  Johnson Sirleaf 
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Evans, Alistair Boddy.  Biography of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.  About.com.  January 2009.  [online] 
URL Available http://africanhistory.about.com/od/liberia/p/Sirleaf.htm 
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notes that her father bore a great many indignities as the “country” ward of an 
Americo-Liberian family.  In a 2005 address she gave to the All Liberia National 
Conference in Columbia, Maryland, she said the following: 
“As a result of my grandfather's friendship and loyalty to President Hilary 
Richard Wright Johnson and on the advice of the President, my father was 
brought to Monrovia, his name changed to Johnson and he was given to the 
settler family, McCritty. He served in the usual manner and suffered the usual 
humiliation of a country boy under the ward system but he was able to get an 
education and become an apprentice which enabled him to become the first 
native representative in the National Legislature and was included in several 
Liberian delegations to meetings abroad.”13 
Her father’s Anglophone name and close ties to the country’s political leadership 
improved his own future prospects, as well as that of his family.  By rejecting his 
indigenous name, Jahmale Johnson and his family benefitted from increased mobility 
and greater freedoms within Liberian society.  Through these personal and political 
connections, he acquired a certain degree of political agency that his daughter would 
ultimately translate into political power. 
The acquisition of an Anglophone name by an indigenous man or family itself 
is predicated on loyalty and the acceptance of contradictory principles and silences.  
Jahmale Johnson was able to move his family from the rural indigenous life in Bomi 
County, to the locus of Liberian power and society because his surname alone 
afforded him political personhood normally denied to the indigenous majority.  In 
“Citizenship at the Margins: Status, Ambiguity, and the Mandingo of Liberia,” 
Augustine Konneh describes how northern Muslim traders were integrated into the 
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Liberian polity.  Until the 1950s, under Tubman’s Unification Policy, the 1847 
Constitution of Liberia’s “blacks only” citizenship provision applied to Americo-
Liberians, only 5% of total population.  Mandingo traders, however, increased their 
status by acting as a conduit for Americo-Liberian-led central government policies in 
the hinterland previously ignored. The Mandingo and Americo-Liberians, both 
considered “foreigners” by native Liberians, forged a mutually beneficial partnership.  
This is how Mandingo traders, rejected by natives because of their Muslim religion, 
nomadic lifestyle and other cultural differences, established a toehold in the Liberian 
economy.  They assisted the Americo-Liberian colonial project by administering 
taxation and domestic trade policy throughout northern and central Liberia.  For this, 
they were granted provisional citizenship in order for the Tubman administration to 
maintain and consolidate control over the interior.14  The same system that allowed 
Mandingos to acquire wealth and status for their service also applied to local chiefs.  
While it is unclear if Johnson Sirleaf’s grandfather, as a Gola chief sought the favor 
and attention of the Americo-Liberian president, one can assume that it was because of 
his willingness to acquiesce to this system of indirect rule, was the sacrifice for which 
he was rewarded.  
Although Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is not the first politically active member of her 
family, she has certainly become more successful than her father.  Her own upbringing 
reflects the complexity of her cultural identity and cultural capital, as well as the 
relationship between identity and power. Johnson Sirleaf’s parents also did not raise 
her since she was brought up in Monrovia by an Americo-Liberian woman named 
Cecilia Dunbar and spent her summers in Jujuleh, Bomi County.  
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In Liberia, the home has important political and ideological significance.  
Helene Cooper’s writes extensively, almost obsessively about the first-world niceties 
that she enjoyed in her aptly titled book, The House on Sugar Beach.  In it, she and her 
adoptive “sister” Eunice, explore the social, cultural, and economic violence of 
second- class citizenship in Liberia.  The home itself was also an important cite of 
assimilation where traditional cultural ties were broken upon the threat of shame and 
punishment.  Cooper recounts how her mother broke her Bassa laundryman’s cultural 
ties that forbid him to wash Eunice’s clothes, Helene’s new Bassa “sister.”  When he 
refused, Mrs. Cooper, Helene’s mother threatened to fire him, saying that he should 
acquiesce because “small shame better than big shame,” meaning the small indignity 
of washing her clothes was better than the shame of unemployment.15 Johnson Sirleaf 
remarked in her address to the U.S. Congress in 2006, that she considers herself lucky 
that she had not borne the types of abuses as a domestic servant such as endured 
described by her father and mother, whose experiences were typical of the daily 
indignities suffered by many in the indigenous community. 
 It was Johnson Sirleaf’s assimilated into a “Congo” personhood through a 
formal (education) and informal (domestic life) assimilation processes that 
transformed her into a higher status Liberian.  Later on, through her education abroad 
(“been to”), and cultural sophistication (“kwiness”) she illustrates how identity can be 
both constructed, and deconstructed in the Liberian context.   While Johnson Sirleaf’s 
attempt at cultural fluidity lay in her ability to claim both her indigeneity as well as her 
Congo-ness, as a product of “both worlds,”16 she had to convince the Liberian public 
that Liberia could in fact move forward incrementally and without totally embracing a 
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radical oppositional identity like the one that George Weah offered.  Without the 
acceptance of her as bi-cultural, she could not effectually argue that the she could be 
both part of the Liberian establishment could protect and defend the rights of the 
country’s indigenous majority. 
Because Johnson Sirleaf deconstructs her identity from the standpoint of a 
Congo (an assimilated indigenous Liberian or African repatriate), she is able to assert 
and give voice to her own indigenous heritage as a part of her Liberian-ness.  
Embedded within her cultural identity, there is an explicit or implicit charge to speak 
into existence new identities and unexplored possibilities that contest, intervene and 
point out the contradictions within the dominant discourse that historically advantages 
mainstream assimilated identities and ideologies.  Because historically marginalized 
groups, and by extension, marginalized cultures are, in large part, deprived of the 
authority to speak, they must engage in a crucial process that reclaims the voice in 
order to speak truth to power and forge a path for discussion about the ways in which 
one’s “political world permeates [their] inner lives.”17  It is this question of voice and 
identity that draws attention to the history of resistance embedded in the oppositional 
identity. This process of reclaiming voice, but also a process of choosing which 
experience or experiences are key to identity, that would make it possible for her to 
play a greater role in shaping not only electoral politics but also expand the 
possibilities of a “postcolonial” nationhood. 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s Congo-ness represented a look backwards rather than 
forwards in Liberian cultural identity.  It signaled her tacit acceptance of the rhetoric 
of repatriation that suggests that one forges a new “globalized” ethnic identity in lieu 
of speaking with an indigenous voice, simply by returning “home” after receiving 
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education abroad.  In Johnson Sirleaf’s case, Harvard University was the Western 
institution that enabled her transformation from an indigenous woman into a member 
of the country’s elite.  It was this logic that not only justified 19th century settler 
colonialism and the “assumption and exercise of power of … been tos,”18 in Liberia 
but also maintains that links to the Western world add value to one’s own identity.  
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, by virtue of her Harvard education and World Bank pedigree is 
a “been to,” ready to take up the reigns of power.  The Congo identity itself indicates a 
stubborn refusal to change course and participate in a peripatetic moment that would 
provide an opportunity to add more voices to the formation of a Liberian identity 
reflective of the country’s indigenous majority.  Johnson Sirleaf is not just an 
indigenous Liberian-cum-Conga woman, but a Westernized black woman leading 
Liberia because of her close proximity and familiarity with Western power.  This was 
in fact the political and historical function of the Americo-Liberian, to serve as a 
cultural and social intermediary between the West and Africa.  Liberia’s 20th 
president, Tolbert, not inspired by the Pan-Africanism of the 1970s, advised members 
of his cabinet and others that Liberia had been established by its founders to provide a 
“non-revolutionary” voice on the continent, a voice that remained moderate even 
during the post-colonial tumult of the 1960s and 1970s.  The name of the country, 
Liberia, meaning “liberty” and the slogan, “the love of liberty brought us here”, is also 
known as the Lone Star state.  This rhetoric reflecting the Hegelian dialectic of Africa 
as the “dark” continent, and Africans, without leadership potential of their own, relied 
upon the West to provide direction. All of this makes clear that the country had not 
actually been built not upon principles of “freedom” but upon a code of silence 
supported by a predilection for bourgeois black identities. 
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Former President Tolbert attempted, and failed, to convince the Liberian public 
that he shared status with indigenous Liberians, had indigenous blood and had suffered 
like they had suffered.  So charged was the issue that when Tolbert suggested that a 
“son of natives”19 would succeed him, he lost critical political support from his True 
Whig Party.  Tolbert, a Vai/ Americo-Liberian hybrid was the second president to 
speak an indigenous language.  He often did so while wearing African dress at 
political rallies, the implicit message being one of solidarity with the indigenous 
people.  These symbolic gestures only seemed to make indigenous Liberians more 
impatient for change and a president that represented an indigenous identity in its 
entirety, rather than a figurative representation of that identity.  The rice riots of 1979 
would later set the stage for the so-called “progressives”, among them Amos Sawyer, 
then a professor at the University of Liberia, to advocate for regime change on the 
basis of majority rule.  Even the slightest suggestion of Congo identity was offensive, 
in that it had historically served as part of a coordinated effort to mask, displace and 
render silent the less mobile, indigenous population and devalue their tastes, talent, 
and knowledge.  Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s articulation of her own “twoness” was a risky 
conceptualization given that indigenous Liberians have shown little or no sympathy in 
the past, towards political leaders of indigenous heritage that participate in any way in 
assimilated or creolized identity.  In the end, for the late President Tolbert, this failure 
to be embraced for his indigenous heritage had been his greatest political liability.   
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf throughout the course of the campaign never 
acknowledged her Congo privilege, despite the fact that her surname and her family’s 
socio-cultural history locates her solidly in the midst of Congo, Country divide.  Her 
political campaign team, including high-powered Washington, DC political consultant, 
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Riva Levinson, made a concerted effort to separate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf from past 
presidential regimes, for fear that Liberians would write her off as the political product 
of the Tolbert or worse, the Taylor regime.    
In the end, this was a gamble, for which she was highly rewarded, as the 
Liberian public responded well to the opportunity to make history in the country, and 
on the continent.  While Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was trying to distance herself from the 
past twenty-three years of civil war, George Weah made no such effort and 
constructed a campaign that while energetic, was mired by the fact that his primary 
constituency was composed largely of demobilized fighters.  It was largely these 
soldiers, many themselves victims of entrapment and forced conscription that had 
terrorized the civilian population at the behest of Charles Taylor, Sekou Conneh and 
other Liberian “big men.”  George Weah’s seemingly too close relationship to former 
combatants seemed to undermine his claims that he was looking for a new way 
forward and brighter future for Liberia.  Many of his critics feared that a vote for 
Weah, and his enlarging band of cronies, would yet again create a power vacuum in 
the same ways that the military and warlord leaders in the past had done, and 
eventually focus more on maintaining and consolidating power than serving the 
Liberian public.  George Weah appeared to confirm these suspicions when upon a visit 
to and campaign rally in Grand Gedeh, Doe’s home county, “he had donned a T-shirt 
with a photo of Doe and had promised two senior security posts to former Doe 
associates … the incident reverberated around the country, particularly in Nimba 
County, the northern county where Doe's troops had been accused of serious abuses 
while seeking to crush Taylor's rebellion.”20  By visiting Doe’s home in Grand Gedeh, 
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George Weah was honoring his hero.  During that campaign rally, he even promised 
Doe’s sister Edith that, as president, he would continue to help her family and Grand 
Gedeh residents just as he had provided them with humanitarian assistance during the 
war, saying “I am like you; I know what it's like to be hungry, or to go to school 
barefoot. Things must change, take your destiny in your own hands!21  While paying 
homage to Doe and the suffering that had occurred in Grand Gedeh, George Weah 
effectually added yet another layer to the history of ethnic tensions between Grand 
Gedeh and Nimba County that had borne the brunt of Doe’s raids in 1983, 1985 and 
the rebel-led National Patriotic Front of Libera bush war in 1997.22  While 
commiserating with one constituency, George Weah was alienating another in the 
more populous and ethnically diverse Nimba County, a county that Johnson Sirleaf 
would later win handily cementing her victory and the presidency in the November 
runoff election.  
In Search of A Peripatetic Moment 
 It as important, as it is surprising that George Weah would assign himself this 
responsibility to take on the mantle of creating or increasing levels of upward mobility 
for disadvantaged Liberians.  Although he had not been expected to take on this cause- 
his humanitarian efforts with the Liberian football team had been well received- this 
election would compel him to articulate his view on larger and more complex 
problems, his vernacular intelligence notwithstanding, for which his professional 
football career had not prepared him.  George Weah, in the fullest sense, had always 
been a Liberian, never alluding to “global” or American citizenship in the ways that 
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Johnson Sirleaf had done.  Instead, he expressed an affinity for a local identity, 
returning often to Liberia during his breaks from football and passing down a second-
generation affinity for Liberia to his American-born son, George Weah Jr.   George 
Weah Jr. expressed an interest in returning to Liberia, a country he had never before 
seen, that could only be attributed to the urgings of his father.  He said that he too 
hoped to return to his father’s country of origin to “play for Liberia,”23 not AC Milan, 
Chelsea or Manchester City.  The younger Weah, in his aspirations to return to play 
for the Liberian national team, hopes literally and figuratively to return “home” to 
Liberia to follow in his father’s footsteps, particularly those footsteps that lead to 
renown on the football pitch.   
On the basis of athletic performance alone, George Weah could not be denied 
as an endearing Liberian national hero.  All Liberians, regardless of class, status or 
cultural background, knew of George’s successes and took pride in the fact that Weah 
had represented the country and raised the profile of Liberia around the world at a time 
when Charles Taylor had turned Liberia into a regional and international pariah, 
spurring conflicts in neighboring Sierra Leone.  Later, rebels in Cote D’Ivoire would 
owe their start to Taylor’s Libyan trained forces.  Although Weah had been wildly 
successful as a football star, transforming his fame and success in sports arena into 
political capital would present many hurdles.   The majority of Liberians felt that 
Weah’s career had not prepared him to lead a country at a time when the country’s 
entire infrastructure was broken. He would have to prove that his popularity could 
transcend sports much like Imran Khan of Pakistan, Otto Jelinek of Canada, Sebastian 
Coe of Great Britain, and other athletes – turned – politicians had done.  He also had 
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to prove that could command the respect of world leaders whose emergency and 
immediate financial support was critical to Liberian recovery.   
The type of vernacular intellectualism and “oppositional” identity that George 
Weah represented had not been performed on such a large scale in Liberia at any other 
time during the country’s history.  Even Charles Taylor, a socio-cultural outlier 
himself, early on had taken offense to Weah, possibly jealous of Weah’s natural 
charisma popularity.  When Weah refused to “remove his sunglasses”24 when greeting 
Taylor, Taylor took it as a sign of disrespect.  Weah is well known globally, and 
within Liberia for marching to the beat of his own drum.  Weah expected, if nothing 
else, to be his own boss, but in many ways, this cavalier attitude made him his own 
worst enemy.  The election was Weah’s to lose and while his populist message 
brought many people to his campaign rallies, his failure to articulate a vision of 
Liberia’s future rendered him unable to turn that grassroots support into votes, at the 
moment when it mattered most.  It was this challenge, his inability to demonstrate his 
competence to the Liberian public, that would prove to be his greatest difficulty.  
While his frequent use of Liberian English during campaign rallies endeared him to 
the public, many wondered if he had the capability, not only to control the hangers-on 
and that his campaign had attracted, but to effectively lead a postwar government. 
George Weah had been raised by his grandmother in the infamous Claratown 
slums of Monrovia and lived, even in the context of a poor Third-World country, a 
hardscrabble life.  He had little schooling, achieving a third grade education and none 
of the opportunities reserved for the Monrovia elite.  Growing up, however, he had 
idolized Samuel Doe, the first indigenous president, who overthrew the William 
Tolbert regime in April 12, 1980.  The wide gulf between Weah’s base (the former 
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child soldiers) and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s (educated elite) can be traced back to that 
moment in particular, when the hypocrisy of Liberia as settler-state was exposed and 
the country imploded.  Samuel Doe, led the seventeen soldiers who murdered 
President Tolbert on April 12, 1980.  Tolbert’s assassination is significant not only 
because it marked the beginning of indigenous rule, but also because Doe, in his ire 
for Tolbert, was holding an ethnically mixed leader (Americo-Liberian/ Vai) 
ultimately accountable for the over 133 years of indigenous oppression, but indicated 
through his ruthless pursuit of Tolbert’s cabinet and family members, including A.B. 
Tolbert, son-in-law to Houphet Boigney, president of neighboring Cote D’Ivoire.  
Houphet Boignet privately tried to intervene on A.B. Tolbert’s behalf, pleading with 
Doe to spare his life, but A.B. Tolbert was executed by machine gun fire like the rest 
of his male family members, a signal that all Americo-Liberians would be punished 
for the transgressions of preceding regimes.25  At the time of the executions, Weah 
was 13 and Johnson Sirleaf 42.  President William Tolbert was assassinated and nine 
days later, thirteen members of his cabinet were tied to telephone poles and machine-
gun fired until death.  These political killings were public, broadcast on Liberian 
television and the images disseminated around the world indicating that Liberians 
were living under a new regime.26  Many Americo-Liberians, unnerved by the public 
executions, went into exile.  Weah’s admiration for Doe was shared by many 
indigenous Liberians and based on a longstanding resentment of Americo-Liberians.  
The ruthlessness with which Samuel Doe and his junta hunted and murdered Americo-
Liberians, to the chagrin of neighboring sitting presidents, illustrated a public desire to 
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see Americo-Liberians displaced, if not expelled, from the country by any means, and 
at any expense. 
Despite the fact that Weah had won the general election on October 11th in a 
field of twenty-two candidates by a slim nine point majority, claiming 28.3% of the 
total vote, (to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 19.8%), Liberian election law maintained that 
the victory had to claim at least 50% of the vote or higher.27  The runoff election to be 
held November 8th would narrow the field to a competition between just the two 
leading candidates, Weah and Johnson Sirleaf.  At a campaign rally, attended largely 
by his core supporters, the demobilized child solders that had comprised many of 
Charles Taylor’s as well as Movement for Democracy in Liberia (M.O.D.E.L.) and 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (L.U.R.D.) fighting forces, Weah 
took on his critics directly, those who had asserted that his lack of education unfit him 
for the presidency.  He engaged, asking, “What have the educated people done for us? 
All of the educated people had failed. With all their education and experience, they 
have governed this nation for hundreds of years. They have never done anything for 
the nation.”28  This was a position that Weah would repeat again and again to his 
crowds would eventually lead them to reply: “He know book, he not know book, we 
will vote for him.”  To his supporters, he represented the possibility of a future in 
which the lack of education and training would not handicap their participation as full 
citizens in the “new” post-war Liberia, an expectation that Weah validated at his 
campaign rallies: 
“We are here to cause the emancipation of our people from their state of abject 
poverty into prosperity.  On October 11, you, the masses, the deprived and 
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abused people of Liberia will go to the polls.  You are going to elect a 
government that must guarantee peace for all Liberians.  Under my leadership, 
you can rest assured that you will enjoy peace and prosperity.  The people love 
me because of my achievements, because of the contribution I have made to 
my country and the role I played in bringing peace”.29  
Weah, while overstating his participation in the political resolution of the Liberian 
Civil War, emphasized not only his commitment to the rehabilitation of Liberians, but 
also intimated a commitment to introduce a more populist form of politics, promising 
a government that worked on behalf of the people living outside of Monrovia, even the 
most destitute and rural areas.   
Unlike Johnson Sirleaf, whose ties to the political establishment made it 
difficult for the youth to warm up to her candidacy, Weah enjoyed almost a cult-like 
following among his supporters throughout the election.  This could be due in large 
part to the fact that his campaign rallies often took place in large arenas or fields 
where, in order to entertain the crowd prior to Weah’s arrival, loud music was pumped 
over loudspeakers and supporters, giving an appearance of rock concert for which 
Weah footed the bill.30  The crowd, composed largely of former fighters, had gotten 
used to a similar message that Weah’s largesse would provide for them.  To this 
severely disenfranchised and stigmatized group, he was  “King George”, a moniker 
that he had chosen himself, calling his radio station King’s FM,31 a brand that he 
would later use again in founding King TV.  It was these rallies in particular, often 
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drawing several thousand attendees, which would lead to Weah’s demise.  In those 
rallies, he came to resemble the warlord past that Liberians so desperately wanted to 
put behind them.  By playing to the longstanding Liberian stereotype of the president 
as the nation’s father, patriarch and sovereign beyond reproach, or in Liberian English, 
“papay”, Weah invited comparisons to the civil war past as Charles Taylor had once 
demanded that members of his “small boy unit” called him “papay.”  Weah responded 
to these concerns saying that he understood and accepted what this title meant and 
took it as a sign of respect saying “Once you take care of people, people respect you.  
They call you ‘papay.’”32  For him, it seemed to be a sign that he, that he, a poor kid 
from the Monrovia slums had succeeded against considerable odds.33  To the war-
weary populous, Weah and his cronies looked disturbingly like the warlord presidents 
of the past.  Weah’s campaign faltered largely because he his political platform and 
bid for voters was hinged on his larger than life personality alone.  With neither a 
political platform explaining how he was uniquely qualified to resolve issues of 
poverty and unemployment in Liberia nor special skills that ensured his ability to turn 
the country around, it was a risk that the beleaguered Liberian electorate did not want 
to take.  If his campaign alone represented Weah’s idea of change, the Liberian voters 
weren’t buying it.   
While the Liberian voters felt that Weah’s politics too closely resembled 
Charles Taylor’s tactics, it was Samuel Doe that Weah actually wanted to imitate. The 
ideology behind the Doe revolution was part of a political philosophy that revolution 
was the only way for indigenous Liberians to reclaim their ancestral land as their 
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birthright.  The complexity of the Doe years, the significance of his strong-arm tactics 
to the instigation of inter-ethnic tension, while not lost on Weah, were considered by 
him, a necessary part of breaking with the Americo-Liberian past.  Weah, whose 
family hailed from the impoverished Grand Kru County in Southeastern Liberia, 
recalls the Doe leadership from 1980 to 1990 as an era of increased opportunities for 
indigenous Liberians.  In fact, it was under the Doe regime that Weah got the break 
that would catapult him onto the international football stage.  President Doe sent the 
national team to Brazil for training at the cost of $100,000.00, money that Liberian 
taxpayers could ill afford to pay.  For Weah, at least, the gamble paid off and he was 
later picked up by French club A.S. Monaco in 1988 at the age of twenty-two.  This 
was a debt, in Doe’s absence, Weah wished to repay to the Liberian people.  In fact, he 
recalls this moment as the rationale for his campaign and bid for the presidency in 
2005.  His campaign manager explained this by saying, “George says he owes that to 
the Liberian people… so that’s why he wants to give back to the society”.34  The 
possibility of Weah’s leadership certainly did excite a war-weary population that at 
several times during the civil conflict felt as if the international community had turned 
their back on them and left them to die.  The possibility of Weah’s leadership meant 
that for many of the former soldiers and war affected youths that, by virtue of his 
celebrity and his profile in the world of professional football, that they, as social 
outcasts, could never again be forgotten.  It was the desire for a population that had 
long been invisible to have the opportunity to be celebrated and experience popularity 
in place of the routine scorn and derision levied upon former combatants.  This was a 
dispossessed group seeking their own voice in the Liberian body politic.   
                                                 
34 Rice, Andrew.  “George Weah’s New Game.”  New York Times, August 21, 2005 
 33 
Johnson Sirleaf took a different, more subdued approach to discussions of 
ethnicity.  While she refused to acknowledge that she enjoyed a disproportionate 
advantage because of her Americo-Liberian and or “Congo” privilege, she argued 
instead that that she was drawing upon her diverse experiences in the West as well as 
her youth in Jujuleh equally, and was a product of Liberia’s “two worlds”.  It is a 
statement of ethnic solidarity, the sincerity of which has been called into question 
along with her penchant for speaking the Gola and Kru languages of her “two illiterate 
grandmothers35” to large crowds on the campaign trail.  Her reclamation of her 
indigenous identity was met with suspicion by the other candidates in the field.  Her 
opponents argued that she was trying to combat the public perception of her as a 
Congo.36  This was a transition that the Liberian public was at first unwilling to 
believe but later came to accept as Johnson Sirleaf’s argument that politicized not only 
her ethnic, but gender, identities. 
Throughout the course of the 2005 election, the indigenous voice, and more 
importantly, the indigenous critique, took on a distinct diction, that of refuting a 
history and rhetoric of exceptionalism that purported elite, non-radical rule by the 
Americo-Liberian and Congo people as the only acceptable paradigm of leadership.  
Johnson Sirleaf, as well as the descendents of former president Tubman, demonstrated 
that the Congo identity, while weakened, is not obsolete, and continues to permeate 
Liberian.  It affects the ways in which Liberians interact with one another.  The main 
perception that Johnson Sirleaf would have to combat, along with other candidates of 
Americo-Liberian pedigree, was that she and other like candidates were part of a 
coordinated Congo resurgence.   
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In response to the threat of a return to pre-war and neo-colonial Congo 
leadership, a group formed called the Heritage Movement, a loose association of 
individuals and politicians, formed with an explicit aim: to “ensure that a person of 
Americo-Liberian or Congo background did not win the presidency.”37  This 
mobilization against Congo leadership in general and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as an 
individual indicate that she was not considered by her peers to be a native or 
indigenous person.  While she could lay claim to indigenous blood, her cultural points 
of reference were “Congo” in nature, along with her Anglophone surname; according 
to the Heritage Movement claim, Johnson Sirleaf could not be an authentic 
representative of the indigenous majority.  The Heritage Movement despite its desire 
to promote indigenous candidates, attacked Weah as well as unqualified despite the 
fact that his ethnic heritage was beyond dispute.  Weah, although a popular athlete, 
was barely literate and not considered a suitable candidate either.  In addition, die-hard 
tribalists, “who see the establishment of a retaliatory hegemonic regime”38 who might 
have sought revenge were also excluded.  The Heritage Movement itself, intimates 
that Liberians are in need of post-colonial leadership that represents neither Liberia’s 
past (either Congo or tribalist) nor present hybridized identity that could be a 
harbinger of persistent instability the country’s future.  It also indicates that the post-
war political environment was no political tabula rasa and issues of indigenous 
exclusion should be brought to bear as an essential part of easing resentments in the 
post-war climate. 
The efforts Johnson Sirleaf had made in an attempt to reclaim her indigenous 
roots in the “new” Liberia was much like what other “repatriated” post-war Liberians 
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like her had attempted to do in order to ease back into post-war life: create an identity 
that locate them in solidarity with long suffering, local indigenous Liberians.  
Repatriated Liberians orchestrated this identity shift without discussing how their own 
absence during the war was in some measure, indicative their own relative privilege.  
Without that discussion, Johnson Sirleaf continues to perpetuate the myth of Congo 
identity as the singular political identity with a unique perspective and authority to 
lead.  Because she refuses to acknowledge the longstanding inequalities between 
indigenous Liberians and Americo-Liberians, Liberians remain caught in a vicious 
cycle in which old notions of coloniality are remade and repackaged in a way that 
positions the Westernized Liberian individual, or “been to” as superior to indigenous 
knowledge, talents and leadership. 
The main difference between Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and George Weah is the 
way in which they provide differing accounts of the past, Weah highlights the 
contradictions embedded in ideas of citizenship and political subjectivity based upon 
the historical marginalization of Liberia’s 16 ethnic groups, while Johnson Sirleaf 
makes little or no mention of this specific type of oppression.  While Johnson Sirelaf 
and Weah are both success stories in their own right, they are actually worlds apart in 
terms of culture, constituency and vision of the Liberian identity.  Because Johnson 
Sirleaf contributes to a mainstream, non-radical and non-oppositional identity as part 
of a cultural and political inheritance of Americo-Liberian leadership, she, in short, is 
seemingly in support of rearticulating the logic of Americo-Liberian settlement that 
purported non-African leadership, and the values of freedom and liberty, would make 
Liberia a model state on the continent.  The dichotomy that is the Liberia project is 
that it can produce a talent such as Johnson Sirleaf, a woman of extraordinary skills 
and abilities – who in light of Tolbert’s assertion is more the exception than the rule - 
while by the same token, masking and marginalizing the indigenous majority. Weah, 
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despite some early missteps, did succeed in giving voice to and shedding light on the 
former combatants and war-affected youth that comprised the majority of his political 
supporters.  This group in particular, much like the rest of the country, was recovering 
from the past traumas and physically embodied, scars and all, the past twenty-three 
years of political violence and struggle.  Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, by virtue of the fact 
that she had enjoyed an uninterrupted education, a safe haven during times of war and 
financial stability represented, in large part, the Liberians that had escaped much of the 
trauma plaguing and handicapping the professional development of the general 
population.   
At best, Johnson Sirleaf speaks of a desire for a postcolonial identity that 
would restore voice, authority and dignity to a long disenfranchised indigenous 
majority who, though subjected to twenty-one years of war, have made little or no 
substantive progress in terms of economic or social transformation.  Liberians have 
suffered in large part because of “too much war, but no revolution.”  Because of 
Johnson Sirleaf’s political history, she cannot authoritatively speak on behalf of 
subjugated indigenous Liberians or initiate an interrogation into whether or not 
Liberian politics has changed, or, if it has, by repositioning “been tos” such as Johnson 
Sirleaf as elites when they return home, has reverted back to the status quo.  
In a runoff election, that literally should have been Weah’s game, Johnson 
Sirleaf tapped into and revealed an electorate unwilling, if, unable to completely reject 
its “bourgeois” past in favor of an uncertain future under Weah.  Weah knew how to 
defend his position based on the Congo versus Country divide but not against Johnson 
Sirleaf’s argument for woman leadership in which she toyed with and reframed gender 
boundaries.  In this modern retelling of the Congo vs. Country divide and dilemma 
upon which Liberia was built, the Congo people, represented by Johnson Sirleaf’s 
triumph again non-native leadership in a potentially radical indigenous African 
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leadership.   It was, in fact an outcome that Congo people had been rehearsing for 
generations.  Johnson Sirleaf could repatriate to Liberia but not be forced to return to 
the colonial past in order to address past wrongs and systemic inequities.    Liberians 
picked the candidate contemplating and rehashing ideas about identity over the 
candidate seemingly too closely tied to the past.  When the final results came in on 
November 23, 2005 with Johnson Sirleaf winning 59.4% of the voter over Weah’s 
40.6% and Weah supporters took to the streets chanting “no Weah, no peace.”  The 
Liberian electorate however was sure that it had made the right decision.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A LONE(STAR) IS BORN 
 
“"It is difficult to start a revolution, more difficult to sustain it. But it's later, 
when we've won, that the real difficulties will begin."39 
-The Battle of Algiers 
 
The Golden Tulip Declaration 
 
Liberian women peacemakers, banned from 2003 Accra Accord peace 
negotiations as third-party stakeholders, were also forbidden from attending the peace 
talks as civil society participant observers.  This exclusion was certainly one of the 
most prohibitive acts experienced by women activists in the wake of United States 
(U.S.) -led humanitarian intervention that forced Charles Taylor into Nigerian exile in 
August 2003.  Liberian women had, after all, played a critical role in highlighting the 
plight of Liberian civilians - the basis for the large-scale Jacques Klein headed15,000 
troop U.N. military intervention - the largest U.N. peacekeeping deployment in the 
world at the time.40 After being denied entry to the Ghanaian-held peace talks, 
Liberian women, during a five-hour meeting in a room in the Golden Tulip Hotel in 
Accra, (adjacent to the conference site), hashed out a response to what they considered 
their exclusion their rightful place at the bargaining table.  This exclusion appeared to 
be a harbinger of things to come in the “new,” post-war, transitional climate in 
Liberia.  Liberian women leaders including Ruth Sando Perry, Etweda Cooper, and 
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Theresa Leigh-Sherman among others, decided not to return to Monrovia from Accra 
without further intervention.  This exclusion produced, firstly, a written censure of the 
peace talks, Liberian women, had after all tried to keep the peace while Charles Taylor 
(Government of Liberia), Sekou Conneh (L.U.R.D.), and Thomas Nimley 
(M.O.D.E.L.) battled for control over Monrovia.  In Accra, Ghana, they realized that 
they would need to identify a politician to run in 2005 who would champion their 
cause.   
During this climatic meeting, they wrote, issued and signed the Golden Tulip 
declaration: it was a rebuttal of their wholesale exclusion from the political 
negotiations.  In it they argued forcefully for the crucial role of women in maintaining 
the tenuous peace as part of Liberian civil society, coordinated in large part by foreign 
donors, troops and the Gyude Bryant-led transitional government.   The document 
critiqued the exclusion of women from the closed-door tripartite meetings amongst the 
warlords and the warlord president, Charles Taylor, arguably the worst president that 
Liberia has ever produced.  His military strategy included conquering neighboring 
territories to create what he called ‘Greater Liberia,’ which included parts of Guinea 
and the diamond mines of Sierra Leone.  
The statement, issued on August 15, 2003, was well received and resonated 
with the negotiating parties, regional and international actors including the United 
Nations Fund for Women (U.N.I.F.E.M.), who supported the women representatives.  
The battle over Liberia’s resources had been fought several times before, and peace 
agreements had been negotiated and broken in 1992 and 1996.  These women 
emphatically asserted that lasting peace in Liberia could only be achieved through the 
substantive incorporation of women into the peace process.  Women as well as 
children had borne the brunt of much of the wartime violence and as such had a 
special understanding of the reconstructive process.  Attendees left that meeting, not 
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only having fashioned a critique of how the peace talks had been conducted, but also 
having refined a political agenda: the insertion of gender as integral to the post-war 
political discourse on peace.    
Ruth Sando Perry was, like no other woman in the room at the Golden Tulip 
hotel, a former Liberian head of state.  She had served as a transitional president from 
September 1996 to August 1997 during a short period of peace.41  Her tenure was the 
result of an Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(E.C.O.M.O.G.) intervention.  The Nigerian-led forces were so notorious for their lack 
of discipline that Liberian’s came to think of them less as peacekeepers and more as 
looters of private property.  In the rural villages, as well as in Monrovia, the acronym 
E.C.O.M.O.G. was said to mean, “Every Car Or Moving Object Gone.”  The effort, 
negotiated by President Obasango, the de facto regional leader and head of the 
region’s largest military force after the 1992 Cotonou Agreement had been broken, a 
treaty between Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (N.P.F.L.), Interim 
Government for National Unity (I.G.N.U.) and Doe’s remaining supporters (Doe was 
killed by Prince Johnson in 1990).42   Perry had served after Amos Sawyer,43 (the 
E.C.O.W.A.S.-supported transitional president from 1990-1994) and before Charles 
Taylor’s infamous 1997 election, after which she turned over power to him.  As 
former president, she chaired the committee and distributed The Golden Tulip 
Declaration to Ghanaian leaders, peace talk mediators, UN representatives and all 
                                                 
41 African Women Presidents and Prime Ministers.  Jenda Journal Online: 
http://www.jendajournal.com/issue9/african_premier_ministers.htm 
42 Tuck, Christopher. "Every Car Or Moving Object Gone"The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia”.  
African Studies Quarterly.  2000 4(1): 1. [online] URL Available  
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm 
43 Amos Sawyer is a noted academic and scholar currently teaching at Indiana University. 
 41 
delegates at the talks during the last days of the formal negotiations.44  The Golden 
Tulip declaration was the culmination of several years work in which women stood up 
for the right to be seen, heard, and counted.  Liberian women, hoping to solidify 
potential gains facilitated by the collapse of the state system, and, by extension, the 
destruction of the linchpins upholding the patriarchical system and would settle for 
nothing less than an equal opportunity to speak out the consequences war has on 
women’s lives.45  Liberian women had used their voices to raise awareness about the 
abuses of women and children as victims of sexual and physical violence over the 
course of the civil war and the peace process would be no different. 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Postwar Gender Dimension 
 Despite the fact that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was neither a signatory nor in 
attendance at the events in Accra, many already believed that she could “succeed” 
Ruth Sando Perry as Liberia’s next female president.  The difference between Sando 
Perry’s and Johnson Sirleaf’s leadership style, represents the tension between 
internationalism and localism.  Perry symbolizes a strong female leader who takes her 
strength from the community and in return is accountable to that community.  Before 
her appointment as transitional president in 1996, Perry was well known for her 
leadership attributes.  Ruth Sando Perry, unlike Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, had little 
political experience at the time of her appointment, having been born into a 
disadvantaged rural family that was not politically connected.  Perry’s hailed from a 
small village in Grand Cape Mount County and was a Muslim of Vai heritage.  In 
Liberian society, her rural ties and Muslim religion makes her achievements that much 
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more incredible because she was able to transcend the Christian Americo-Liberian 
hierarchy in order to become a serious political figure.  Perry completed her secondary 
education and higher education in Liberia and after receiving her teaching degree in 
from Teachers College at the University of Liberia in Monrovia.  She then returned to 
Cape Mount to teach at a local community school.  Unlike Johnson Sirleaf whose 
longstanding international connections are well known, Perry decided to forgo an 
education overseas, choosing to reside in Cape Mount and participate in a distinct type 
of “localism,” focusing on the developing the local community in contrast to Johnson 
Sirleaf’s penchant for finding work internationally.  It is prescient that Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, a woman better known for her achievements abroad, than her contributions at 
home would go on to overshadow Perry, who had a more regional and community 
development focus.  It was Sando Perry of course, that introduced the Liberian public 
to the idea of a woman president but Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (by virtue of her 
international stature and prominence) that introduced the world to Liberian political 
(and peace) women. 
Johnson Sirleaf’s decision to leave Liberia, during times of intense fighting, 
and serve in high-profile Western financial institutions such as Citibank (and later the 
World Bank) was an integral part of her campaign platform and reputation as a 
reform-minded candidate.  Her work abroad was facilitated by crucial, if not historic 
occurrence: the creation of the Bretton Woods financial institutions in the 1940s that 
created the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The advent of these 
institutions, in which she worked and trained, indicated the replacement of an 
ideologically-drive post-colonial optimism and with a neoliberal ideology.  Bretton 
Woods institutions undermined the nationalism driving the anti-colonial ideologies of 
the 1960s and 1970s, if not the sovereignty of many of Liberia’s neighbors, 
particularly Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire.  Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of a “United States 
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of Africa” in the 1960s and Leopold Senghor’s earlier articulation of a cultural 
revolution of negritude Senegal that spread to francophone Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea 
were replaced by a Keynesian approach to third-world local, regional and international 
development.  By 2003, Liberia was considered a failed state and subject to the 
strategies of development that directly injected international non-governmental 
organizations (I.N.G.O.s) into the roughshod civic and political environment that was 
post-war Liberia.  Shortly before the Accra Accord, the United States renewed its 
formerly broken diplomatic ties (suspended in order to protest the lawless Taylor 
regime) and renewed the development assistance it had rescinded in 2000.  Taylor’s 
exit from Liberia precipitated the return of international development organizations as 
well as development assistance. 
At the time of the 2003 Accra Accord, and the issuance of the Golden Tulip 
Declaration, the struggle of Liberian women’s organizations to survive in the presence 
of international peacekeeping bodies had reached a critical juncture.  For women 
leaders, who had become an integral part of local Liberian peacemaking and 
peacekeeping processes, struggled to remain relevant in the post-war context.  With 
I.N.G.O.s implementing programs and strategies in overlapping, but not necessarily in 
cooperation, with local, women’s organizations, the stature of Ruth Perry, Mary 
Brownell and Etweda Cooper, was somewhat reduced.  These women leaders knew 
that they would need to create more structures to organize and rally behind a single 
leader in order to advance their strategy of female civil action.  Liberia at this critical 
moment, represented a distinct post-war, but not postcolonial moment in which the 
end of violent conflict invited the return of Liberia’s professional political class, 
including Johnson Sirleaf, that benefitted from a fragile peace that was the culmination 
of over a decade of robust women’s political and social activism. 
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The struggle for women’s participation in the reconstruction of Liberia 
intensified under the Gyude Bryant headed transitional government.  Bryant led the 
government from 2003 to 2005.  The women’s organizations including Mano River 
Women's Peace Network (M.A.R.W.O.P.N.E.T.), Women in Peacebuilding Program 
(W.I.P.N.E.T.) and Liberian Women’s Initiative (L.W.I.) that strongly advocated for a 
regional solution for Liberia in order to achieve a long-term peace strategy were 
overshadowed by a different statist solution promoted by I.N.G.O.s.  I.N.G.O.s in 
Liberia, facilitated by the United States Agency for International Development 
(U.S.A.I.D.) began to coordinate and implement emergency assistance programs that 
overlapped with and oftentimes overshadowed the relief and recovery efforts of 
Liberian women’s groups.  For Ruth Perry and other Liberian women leaders, who 
had more local and regional connections than Johnson Sirleaf, their commitment to a 
regional and local solution remained consistent.  In fact, the women’s peacemaking 
model had been the only form of opposition to the war that had succeeded and thrived 
from the 1990s to 2003 when international diplomatic attempts to resolve the Liberian 
conflict failed. 
The Liberian peace women became a testament of resilience and strength that 
resonated throughout the country, and Johnson Sirleaf became the symbol of their 
extraordinary achievement.  Frustrated female constituents, still smarting from the 
slights of the Accra Accord, refused to be left out of the national dialogue on 
reconstruction and reconciliation: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and her bid for the presidency 
represented the opportunity to solidify any gains that they had made through their 
peace advocacy and anti-war efforts during the latter stages of the civil war.  Johnson 
Sirleaf’s global renown and her reputation for reform and success in a “first-world” 
environment provided the platform from which Liberian women could find an 
international to could continue to advocate for inclusiveness, equal political rights and 
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representation.  Liberia, like most post-conflict countries, make the greatest strides 
towards inclusiveness in post-conflict situations.  Post-war reconstruction in Rwanda 
led to an almost 50:50 representation of women in the legislature, post-apartheid South 
Africa had a female deputy president in 2005, and advancements in women leadership 
have also occurred in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Congo-Kinshasa.46  The Golden Tulip 
Declaration was just the beginning of such an appeal, facilitated by this crucial and 
historic moment, to ensure that the decolonization of the mind- to borrow Ngugi 
Wa’Thiongos’s concept- and the multiplicity of Liberian identities it exposed, had a 
gendered dimension.   
The representation of gender and internationalism in Johnson Sirleaf is 
encapsulated in her anti-rape platform, a message that resonate with the women who 
had rallied to form self-protective communities and community associations based 
largely in Monrovia.  Rape had been a tool of war that had been used indiscriminately 
by all warring parties as a form of violence, intimidation and even as a soldier’s 
reward for bravery in battle, akin to looting.47  It was practiced in which all groups that 
had participated in the Accra peace talks (Government of Liberia, Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) 
engaged.  Women had many responsibilities during the war, first and foremost to 
protect young children.  They also had the responsibility to find food, “keeping the 
children safe, and in many instances… hiding the men from danger.”48  While men 
were most visible on the front lines of the fighting, women had to heal their families 
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and maintain the community.  Men were kept out of the crossfire but girls often 
became the victims of rape when they left their homes to forage for scarce food and 
supplies during times when their husbands, brothers and sons could not, for fear that 
they would be forcibly conscripted into the government or rebel armies.  An anti-rape 
message had yet to find its way into the mainstream Liberian consciousness despite 
the femicide campaigns begun by the United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(U.N.I.F.E.M.) and the global breadth of the Beijing Conference on Women in which 
Hilary Clinton famously declared that women’s rights as “human rights”49 had yet to 
make an impact on the grassroots level.  Liberian women, not wanting to be left out of 
the debate not only on identity, but on reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, made 
the case that women as wives, mothers and teachers and were more likely to contribute 
to their communities.  They not only wanted protection from violence, but better job 
prospects and the opportunity to improve their skills through education.   
The liberation of women, as well as her pro-education agenda, created the 
opportunity for Johnson Sirleaf to attract women voters who felt that the post-war 
climate had marginalized their efforts to sharpen an anti-war political consciousness.  
In a surprising twist, Johnson Sirleaf found an unlikely constituency among female 
former combatants (former combatants even under the transitional government were 
still beholden to their former rebel and government leaders), non-combatant war 
affected youth also articulated this desire for a formal education and support for 
Johnson Sirleaf.  Black Diamond, an infamous fighter for the LURD rebel army (led 
by Sekou Conneh), had willingly joined the rebel forces to seek retribution for her 
rape, and the death of her parents at the hands of Charles Taylor’s infamously 
undisciplined soldiers.  She rose through the ranks to become a Commander, the 
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highest level of command achieved by any female combatant.50  During several 
interviews after the war, she talked about not only her willingness, but the urgency for 
an education that would order to improve herself, as well as improve the life prospects 
of her young daughter whom she affectionately calls “small diamond”.  Black 
Diamond, who had, during and after the war, become a local celebrity for being a 
woman succeeding in a “man’s world” of frontline combat, said in multiple interviews 
that she saw her own future as indelibly linked to the future of the country:  She says, 
“School pays. Your pen and paper will not leave you tomorrow,” 51 openly making the 
connection that the ephemeral end of the conflict had left her without a job to do.  In a 
later interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), she put it more 
bluntly, “We achieved our target.  Taylor has left the country.  I want to go to 
school.”52  Twenty-two year old Black Diamond, despite her fearsome combat 
training, was like much of Liberia’s youth, hopeful that in peacetime they could return 
to more mundane activities, like education.  Even Sekou Conneh’s wife, (Sekou 
Conneh, after having participated as LURD representative in the peace talks, had 
begun positioning himself for a 2005 presidential bid) publicly parted with him, on 
January 20, 2004, con the basis that he was threatening to derail the peace process.  
She said that she had “seized control because she believed her husband was putting the 
peace process at risk...  She declared: ‘I am here as a peacemaker and mother for 
all.’”53  In this statement, that stoked the ire of her husband and derailed his later 
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presidential bid, she articulated that the woman’s role in Liberia was changing and the 
country’s leadership would have to change with it. 
Liberian youth were the unintended victims of a vicious power vacuum that 
had enveloped the country for nearly 23 years.   An entire generation of young people 
had received little or no formal education.  They needed education and re-training that 
wholesale, only the Liberian government could provide.  For those young people and 
former rebels that willingly disarmed, they did so because they saw the end of fighting 
as a new beginning.  Liberia’s future relied upon those individuals such as Black 
Diamond and Aisha Conneh after spending years in combat, effectually contributing 
to the country’s destruction, finding the wherewithal to rebuild it.   
In the political battles that Johnson Sirleaf would have with George Weah, 
Johnson Sirleaf self-consciously portrayed herself as a liberated, indigenous woman, 
casting aside a formerly colonial “Congo” identity in order to do battle against a sexist 
patriarchy reminiscent of a time when warlords reigned.  The male leaders, she 
argued, were woefully out of touch with the needs and desires of the average Liberian.   
In this construction, Johnson Sirleaf became a veritable “woman warrior” who much 
like the female fighters that took up arms to defend themselves against physical 
attacks, she was doing battle against an institutionalized partiarchical system in order 
to ensure that in the political arena women and children had a voice and would not 
again become the casualties of a scramble for power.   Johnson Sirleaf was, in fact, 
fighting definitively on behalf of “third world” women.  Johnson Sirleaf’s ability to 
command an audience with both Liberian and Western media could facilitate a 
historic, if not critical imperative: she brought the struggles of Liberian women 
peacekeepers to light, in order initiate a discussion on securing women’s rights as an 
inimical part of the reconstruction or “decolonization” of Liberia.   
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Johnson Sirleaf’s gender argument positioned her as a champion of a women’s 
rights issues that provided Liberian’s women’s organizations with a genealogy that 
showed their impact on the conflict as well as the post-conflict environment.  Her 
promotion of gender balance positioned her well in relation to her local Liberian and 
international audience.  The World Bank had made gender equality a priority and 
emphasized girls’ education as a means of achieving that goal and strengthening 
communities.  International audiences, particularly U.S. government officials, also 
commended her run for the presidency on the basis that the success of the U.S.-led 
intervention could be solidified by her historic election capitalizing the potential to 
make her presidency an African success, story satisfying a desire for a successful 
resolution to the civil conflict, one that would historically mark the country again as 
“exceptional” as well as stable, and on the course towards sustainable development. 
Liberian Women’s Organizations 
By mid-2004, Liberian women peacemakers were well known throughout 
Liberia and the region for their strategies of anti-war protest; they took as part of their 
inspiration, the non-violent, passive resistance campaigns.  They also regularly used 
their familial connections to encourage dialogue amongst the warring factions.  One of 
Liberia’s peace women said of bringing rebel leaders from different warring groups to 
the same table, “when your mother calls you, you must show up,”54 meaning that 
women used their personal influence and relationships as relatives of warring parties 
in order to force the combatants to negotiate with one another.  The Liberian Women’s 
peace movement incorporated several different independent organizations including 
the L.W.I., W.I.P.N.E.T., M.A.R.W.O.P.N.E.T., the National Women’s Commission 
of Liberia (N.A.W.O.C.A.L.) and the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia 
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(A.F.E.L.L.) as members and represented a remarkable achievement in women helping 
women.   
Liberian women’s organizations, in addition to leveraging their direct personal 
relationships with the warring factions to guide them towards a peaceful interactions, 
added their own traditional cultural aspects to the anti-war movement.  During their 
peace protests and demonstrations, they often attended and hosted meetings dressed 
from head to toe in all white, the international symbol for peace, which had specific 
regional and Liberian cultural significance.  The Poro and the Sande societies, cultural 
institutions in Liberia, as well as Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire 
teach women how to play a peace-making role as part of their spiritual and social 
maturation into womanhood: “A woman has the privilege to attend both the Poro and 
Sande societies.  Most times, the chief Zoe of these societies is a woman who has been 
trained in the two schools.  As a chief Zoe she is responsible to arbitrate major crises 
like war.”55  These women often wear white, and used white chalk to draw a dividing 
line between warring parties during the peace processes.  Liberian women borrowed 
from traditional practices as an immutable cultural resource that provided the socio-
cultural context for their coordinated interventions as well as the wherewithal to think 
creatively about non-violent strategies.  The use of cultural markers was also an 
attempt to indicate that the problem of conflict needed not just a local, but a regional, 
solution.  In their attempts to institute a uniquely Liberian solution to a pervasive 
regional problem, the activities of Liberian women peacemakers preceded the statist-
centered peacekeeping approach implemented by the United Nations.  Despite the fact 
that Liberian women peacekeepers had pushed for and created neutral spaces for 
mediation, the arrival of international peacekeepers effectively overwhelmed and 
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replaced the efforts of Liberian women from their peace making role and in the post-
war environment, rendering them voiceless and without a proverbial seat at the table. 
 The intersection of gender and non-violent and silent peace protests resonate 
convincingly as a symbol of resistance among women living in the Monrovia as well 
as those women displaced from their rural villages residing in the Monrovia’s 
temporary homes and communities.  The crux of the peace movement was the 
assertion that women as wives, mothers and teachers had a large stake in the future of 
Liberia and their protection and physical security had to be a critical success factor in 
the “new” Liberia.  In an astute political maneuver, Johnson Sirleaf invoked the 
importance of women’s rights, which enabled her to make a connection between her 
own candidacy and the futures of women and children all over Liberia.  It was a 
message made, in part to suggest that a lack of women leadership is what had 
prolonged (if not precipitated) Liberia’s downward spiral.  Setting aside an argument 
about the root causes of the conflict, it was resoundingly clear, that without education 
and rehabilitation programs, specifically targeting many of Liberia’s youth could 
return to conflict simply because the looting and war profiteering the civil war 
permitted was more lucrative than the allure of a lasting peace.  “Education is a very, 
very big challenge for us. As I mentioned in another forum, it’s probably for the first 
time in the history of many nations that the younger generation is less educated, less 
knowledgeable and less informed than the older—a complete reversal of worldwide 
trends.”56  Johnson Sirleaf’s commitment to education and the (re)-training of Liberian 
youth was part of an imperative that would, through investing in women’s groups and 
associations, ensure that young women would receive the mentoring and guidance 
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necessary to emulate the achievements of women leaders and learn how to leverage 
the power of their unique critique.  The focus on engaging and enriching the lives of 
Liberian women and girls suggested that the next socio-cultural revolution in Liberia 
would be a peaceful one.   
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Post-War Problematic 
 Within the local and international community, across political and ideological 
boundaries, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been perceived in many different ways.  Local 
women leaders view her as a skilled politico who benefitted from, but was not part of, 
a grassroots political effort to increase the representation of women in politics.  The 
United States and I.N.G.O.s view her as a willing and creditworthy partner in the 
physical reconstruction of Liberia.  She has been portrayed by the international media, 
hungry for the transformation of Liberia from Africa’s “basketcase” to its “poster 
child” identify as the future of Liberia, and potentially the future of leadership on the 
continent.  This optimism begs the question as to whether or not the mantle of the 
African Renaissance, articulated by (the now deposed), South African president Thabo 
Mbeki in the late 1990s, could be borne by a woman.  Johnson Sirleaf is not just any 
woman, but a woman with education and connections that has been vetted, and 
approved by Western institutions for her reliance upon democratic principles in the 
(re)construction of the state.  In short, she is perceived as indicative of a return to 
Liberian “bourgeois” leadership that bowed to Western interests in the country and the 
region.  Like many symbolic figures, she represents an era of women’s achievement in 
politics but has yet to prove that she takes a substantive interest in the issues facing 
women.  Since her election and her stirring arrival on the global political scene many 
have made predictions about the future impact of her presidency.  The documentary 
film, Iron Ladies of Liberia, situates Johnson Sirleaf and Liberia as part of a “quiet 
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revolution” on the continent in which business oriented MBA presidents like Thabo 
Mbeki in South Africa represent a “third wave” of democratization in which African 
presidents are labeled progressive, if they willingly submit to free market principles 
and adjustments as part of their reconstruction agenda, Johnson Sirleaf figured in a 
post-war climate and Mbeki in a post-apartheid environment.  Bureaucrats, lawyers 
and businesspeople have supplanted the optimistic zeal and legacy of legendary 1960s 
post-colonial African leadership. 
 Because Liberia never experienced a sustained post-colonial moment 
(Americo-Liberian descended (neo) colonialists remain and an integral part of 
Liberian society), during the anti-colonial movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
country has never been fully understood as a post-colonial nation.  The extent to which 
it is appropriate to write Johnson Sirleaf as a post-colonial figure is based on the extent 
to which she positions herself as a progressive intellectual rather than a politician.  The 
extent to which the post-colonial leader is possible in contemporary Africa is also in 
question.  Is the 21st century post-colonial politician one that has participated in and 
has been accepted by the “metropole” or the ideal leader a (radical), intellectual, with 
no ties to or aspiration for Western acceptance or power?  To what extent is 
contemporary African leadership progressing towards open and free societies, and to 
what extent do can we see and place the Johnson Sirleaf election as part of an 
emerging global black elite and the creation of a new non-aristocratic but still 
bourgeois “titular” class? 
 Within this construction of global black elitism in Liberia, (of the original 22 
candidates in the general election, 4 candidates had assets valued more than $1 
million) the majority of candidates returning from the diaspora were wealthy even by 
Western standards.  Johnson Sirleaf’s ability to speak on behalf of poor, traumatized, 
disenfranchised women was mediated through her own ability to identify and 
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transform needs into an accessible campaign platform emphasizing the need for 
education and jobs.  In order to identify and mark Johnson Sirleaf as a post-colonial 
politician it is important to rethink and understand what represents a sustainable 
postcoloniality.  In order to identify and rethink Johnson Sirleaf as a global citizen, it 
is necessary to rethink what it means to be a leader of a fragile state.  It is no surprise 
that Johnson Sirleaf, once elected, would begin to rally for the diaspora’s return to 
Liberia, hoping the repatriation of those who left Liberia (many in order to circumvent 
local hierarchies that would have precluded their success) and others who departed to 
avoid civil war violence, could fill the country’s talent gaps.    
 Johnson Sirleaf set her sights on filling key cabinet posts with female 
leadership.  She succeeded in placing “women in all the strategic places you know- 
finance, justice, commerce, you know- police director… And I think that sends a 
strong signal that we believe that women who have the competence – chances are, 
based on our experience, do have a higher level of integrity.”57  She made these 
appointments, in order to meet the expectations of the Liberian female electorate, but 
also justified these appointments using the rationale that women were more 
trustworthy and altruistic and less prone to corruption.  Little is said however, about 
the strong diasporic presence in her cabinet.  Antoinette Sayeh, Finance Minister is a 
former World Bank and International Monetary Fund colleague.  Whether or not a 
repatriated diasporic cabinet member, much like an ethnic or (gender) minority is 
more likely to invest in the local community remains to be seen.  
While necessity of diasporic political appointments is clear in the depopulated 
post-war environment, the rationale as to whether or not the diaspora can serve in 
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government with increased transparency and accountability is unclear.  While she was 
not the only female candidate in the race, Margaret Tor-Thompson campaigned for the 
top spot with the Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia and a female vice-president, 
Amelia Ward was on the Liberty Party ticket, Johnson Sirleaf was the only candidate 
to openly discuss gender as a part of her campaign.  She discussed the special needs of 
women and sympathized with the suffering of women and children.  She was able to 
do this in such a way that made the inclusion or protection of women and children 
synonymous with the success of her leadership and the development of Liberia as a 
nation.  It was for this reason that when she was elected president, her victory was 
hailed a “triumph” by international observers.  Never before had women and gender 
taken center stage in a country better known for its war crimes more than its politics.  
This single act, the acknowledgement and inclusion of women in Liberian politics, at 
the highest level, brought Johnson Sirleaf into a new paradigm in which an African 
nation could match and even surpass its First World counterparts in terms of creating a 
more inclusive citizenry.  As president, she became one of twelve female heads of 
state world, many of whom come from the “Third World” countries.  Johnson Sirleaf, 
however, when compared to the likes of her third-world contemporaries, Michelle 
Bachelet of Chile, Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Philippines and Cristina 
Fernandez de Kircher of Argentina stands out because she is neither a political legacy 
nor married to a former politician.  Johnson Sirleaf is essentially in a league of her 
own: a member of a historically disenfranchised group who through popular election 
(not arms) took the reigns of leadership, in part, because of a social evolution, if not 
revolution.   
 The magnitude of Johnson Sirleaf’s election gave hope because if Liberians 
could overcome the historical inequities of discrimination against women to elect a 
female president, that the country could succeed in other areas as well.  Indeed, the 
 56 
country that Johnson Sirleaf inherited was not only war-torn and underdeveloped, but 
a failed state in every sense of the term.  Johnson Sirleaf even remarked of the country 
during a congressional address that while the nation that she led had once thrived, it 
was first or second from the bottom in terms of development.  She had finally 
achieved the position that she had strove for her entire life, but the work at hand was 
laborious and the hands available to do it were few.   
 Johnson Sirleaf relied upon the idea of repatriation and, contributing to the 
message of regionalism advanced by Liberian women peace organizations, envisaged 
a diasporic effort in which Liberian professionals like herself, who had either fled the 
civil war during the 1980s or the 1990s, would return  “home” to Liberia in order to 
assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.  Her push for the diaspora’s 
return was based on a distinct form of nationalism borrowed from African American 
intellectualism, that Liberians could better help other Liberians because their efforts 
would be part of longer term, sustained development, for the country, rather than the 
well-funded, emergency and quick-impact programs initiated by the United Nations 
and the U.S.A.I.D. partners such as Creative Associates, Mercy Corps and Catholic 
Relief Services, that did not have a local or regional focus on capacity building.  These 
U.S.-based organizations and institutions, facilitated by the U.S.A.I.D.  Office of 
Transition Initiatives was among the first to respond to the crisis, in large part because 
of their longstanding relationship as private sector partners of the aid organization.  
These I.N.G.O.s began to establish a relationship with donor agencies in order to fund 
accelerated vocational training and rehabilitation programs geared towards war 
affected and displaced youth.  The overarching problem with this approach is that 
instead of partnering with local organizations, I.N.G.O.s implemented programs and 
services using expatriate workers at the expense of developing local talent.   
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 Many women’s organizations bore the brunt of the expatriate international 
presence.  The Liberian Women’s Initiative, founded in 1994 and chaired by Etweda 
“Sugars” Cooper is currently no longer in existence.  During a conference on gender 
co-hosted by the Ministry of Gender and Development and the Women NGO 
Secretariat, more than 300 women attending called upon for the elections commission 
to “ensure that electoral reforms and processes are gender sensitive and that women 
throughout Liberia were sufficiently sensitized about their right to vote and the need 
for exercising their rights.”58  They articulated the need for economic rights as well, 
calling for the Government to “strengthen the Liberianization laws and encourage the 
capacity building (soft loans, trade visits, import/export facilities, others) of women to 
effectively engage and compete in the industrial sector.”59  The issue of capacity 
building arose before the 2005 election, largely because the intervention of 
peacekeeping groups and international non-governmental organizations made it 
difficult for local organizations to compete.  International organizations such as 
Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps and Creative Associates International, funded 
by the U.S.A.I.D and coordinated by the Office of Transition Initiatives (O.T.I.), 
developed programs and recruited expatriates to fill the positions.  The women’s 
groups that had formed and operated up until August 2003 found that without the 
funds needed to be relevant in the post-war environment they quickly became 
obsolete, many of them disbanding altogether. As women leaders, figuratively, and 
largely unwillingly, “turned over,” peacekeeping responsibilities to the United Nations 
peacekeeping troops, the association’s members transitioned into other areas and 
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became vocal advocates for voter registration drives, often facilitating information 
sessions in rural areas to educate women about their right to vote.   
Johnson Sirleaf’s support among women was considerably more than that of 
Weah’s.  Johnson Sirleaf had adopted a very critical approach.  She engaged in a 
listening tour, traveling to remote areas of the country in order to hear citizen’s voice 
their concerns.  The Liberian women’s organizations and their activist orientation 
provided Johnson Sirleaf with a model and method of outreach throughout her 
campaign.  A number of women’s organizations, including the L.W.I. endorsed 
Sirleaf’s campaign, leading to her victory in the runoff election.60   
 While campaigning in rural Liberia, Johnson Sirleaf spoke mainly using 
Liberian vernacular English, Liberia’s lingua franca and, engaging in - to borrow from 
Grant Farred’s conception of the vernacular intellectual – a discourse derived from 
Liberia’s long history of inequality.  While the country’s most prestigious form of 
language, standard English was used by her campaign in formal political speeches, 
print and broadcast media, Liberian English demanded that Johnson Sirleaf reject her 
own privilege as a Congo and offer a new paradigm of herself as a politician and of 
Liberian political life.  For the tens of thousands of unlettered Liberians, this language 
was the only non-indigenous shared language available for their use.  Many of the 
organizing activities of the Liberian Women’s Initiative used Liberian vernacular 
English.  While on the road, traveling throughout the country, Johnson Sirleaf did too.  
This use of Liberian vernacular English, the only appropriate language to not only 
served to bolster her image as a woman who could “comfort” the nation during a time 
of grief, loss and reconstruction, but also showed a willingness to serve as a conduit 
for a cultural revolution, and the ability to listen to and articulate the needs of a 
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disenfranchised community as they had communicated them to her.  It was the first 
time a candidate not only spoke directly to Liberian citizens (in contradistinction of 
speaking for them), but offered the opportunity for them to respond to her, 
rhetorically, with a colloquially. 
 Liberians, while largely disenfranchised during the 1985 and 1997 Taylor and 
Doe elections, had used vernacular and Liberian English in order to refute the electoral 
abuses, overlooked by the international community in order for both elections to be 
declared “free and fair.”  In order to articulate their frustration about the levels of 
violence and voter intimidation that preceded the vote, they summed up their voting as 
under duress saying, “You killed my ma.  You killed my pa.  I will vote for you,” in a 
sense gruesomely describing how they “democratically” elected Charles Taylor, under 
very undemocratic conditions.  While Johnson Sirleaf had access to, and could have 
used the Gola or Kru languages, the languages of her indigenous grandparents to 
communicate with rural constituents, she chose to speak instead to speak a language of 
linguistic importance to her theme of national unification.  To Johnson Sirleaf, 
national unification was an important endeavor. It was imperative to focus on the 
cultural traits and values that Liberians had in common rather instead of using 
indigenous language as a reminder of the problems that divided them.   
 Clearly, Johnson Sirleaf’s sense of social justice, and her conception of a 
universal Liberian identity grew out of her experience as a member of the indigenous 
or Afro-Liberian community.  Her modes of communication, self-expression and dress 
also drew upon the resources that she had been exposed to as a member of that 
community.  Johnson Sirleaf’s communication style and method of political outreach 
the embodied the women’s rights struggle in Liberia.  Johnson Sirleaf not only 
accessed pre-war conceptions of female leadership (a tradition evidenced by the 
adoption of Poro and Sande principles to peacemaking), but also tapped into post-war 
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sentiments that Liberian women were a strong and immutable force that had crafted an 
anti-war message that not only captivated the nation, but had invited the attention of 
the entire world.  Johnson Sirleaf’s ability to tap into this sentiment and articulate to 
an even larger audience the role the peacemaking role that women had played in 
Liberia and ensure that role and place in the country’s history was the extent to which 
she could succeed in her political campaign.  It had been Liberian women after all that 
had begun to return and rebuild their communities proving that they were not only 
capable of leadership, but had a special stake in ensuring that the country achieved a 
lasting peace. 
Johnson Sirleaf energized politics as a cultural event, an opportunity to both 
showcase her personal and professional skills as well as her ability to think 
strategically about Liberia’s best interests in the near, as well as long term.  Many of 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s counterparts will say that she is gifted, even more will argue 
that her success is the result of her hard work.  Indeed, during her first few weeks in 
office, she was known to keep long hours, rising early in the morning (before 6am) 
and at times leaving the office after 11pm proving, that the reconstruction of Liberia to 
be a Sisyphean task, and Johnson Sirleaf as its leader, the re-configured, black and 
diasporic Sisyphus.   
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CHAPTER 3 
REPATRIATION AS PATRIOTISM: THE FUTURE OF LIBERIA 
 
Johnson Sirleaf is perforce the first African president to celebrate her personal 
and professional connections to American culture, traditions and capital.  At the 
beginning of her presidency, she made it clear that repatriated talent would play an 
important role in her administration, filling key cabinet posts and recapitalizing the 
country’s private sector.  In fact, attracting direct investment from the Liberian and 
African American diaspora was central to her strategy for replacing U.N. and U.S. 
emergency financial assistance with a sustainable development policy.  Shortly after 
her inauguration, universally hailed by the American government as a triumph of 
democracy over autocracy in Liberia, Johnson Sirleaf put her plan into action.  She 
traveled to the United States to extend a personal invitation to members of the 
diaspora, who like her had fled the violence, to return home:  she could ensure the 
country’s stability if they could return to invest in and help rebuild the country.   
She included this plea in her January 16, 2006 inaugural address to the nation: 
“We call upon our colleagues of all political persuasions now in the Diaspora to return 
home and join us in meeting this exciting challenge of national renewal.”61  This 
appeal was more identifiable as a symbol of diasporic “internationalism,” and 
patriotism than nationalism.  It was not long after that address that the Liberian 
government produced video and written materials reinforcing the idea that African 
Americans business leaders had a key role to play in both repatriating and 
recapitalizing Liberia.  The release of documentary films produced and re-aired in the 
United States leading up the election, including PBS’ Liberia: America’s Stepchild 
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and Jonathon Stack’s Liberia: An Uncivil War focused on the unintended 
consequences of U.S. Foreign policy in Liberia and the eleventh-hour intervention that 
lead to Taylor’s ouster.  All of this contributed to widespread popular support for 
Johnson Sirleaf’s presidency the association of her with peace in the country.  The out-
of-control violence that the films documented created a perception problem that 
Johnson Sirleaf would have to challenge in order for her message to resonate.   
For leaders and purveyors of popular culture in the West supportive of the role 
of women in politics, the Johnson Sirleaf election was met with enthusiasm.  For the 
January 16, 2006, inaugural event, the United States sent a powerful delegation 
including First Lady Laura Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in order to 
illustrate the strength of the unique relationship between the U.S. and Liberia.  For 
Rice, this was not her first stay in Liberia, she had visited Monrovia for several days 
as a child; this second trip in an official capacity in support of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 
administration was, something of a symbolic return.  Johnson Sirleaf’s conception of 
repatriation, and her celebration of her American ties, made her more identifiable as a 
symbol of the ability of educated blacks to lead.   Johnson Sirleaf’s work ethic, 
combined intensity, drive and the “bootstrapping” of Condoleeza Rice, with a 
domestic policy focus on improving the lives of women and children like that of 
Hilary Clinton.  With her stern, yet soft voice, she represented, as opposed to Hilary 
Clinton’s “sisterhood of the traveling pantsuits,” a softer, more grandmotherly 
womanhood.  With her ability to convene diverse groups, and create a constituency 
among both genders, her political power was more accessible, unlike the gender 
neutrality represented by Margaret Thatcher or Madeleine Albright.  In early 2006, it 
had already become clear that Hilary Clinton was positioning herself to campaign for 
the Democratic nomination, and with Vice President Dick Cheney retiring from 
electoral politics, Condoleeza Rice’s name had been circulated as a possible contender 
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for the Republican nomination.   The 2006 inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
functioned simultaneously as a critique of pervasive patriarchical control over the 
American presidency, as much as it highlighted the advances being made in “third 
world” countries, producing upwardly mobile female leadership in political systems 
far younger than the American democracy. 
  Johnson Sirleaf, having beaten a celebrity politician to win the presidency, has 
replaced Weah in the public eye, (Weah has reportedly gone back to school with the 
intent to challenge Johnson Sirleaf in 2012),62 to become somewhat of a celebrity 
politician herself.  Because of her unprecedented political success, Johnson Sirleaf was 
featured on the Oprah Winfrey Show in May 2006 in a program showcasing women 
political leaders worldwide.  Johnson Sirleaf’s Ivy League pedigree, rags-to-riches 
story and focus on substantively improving the lives of Liberian women and girls, 
made her an inimitable guest for the show and provided her with an outlet to reach the 
mainstream American public with her message. 
Johnson Sirleaf’s Oprah appearance came at an opportune time.  Discussions 
of black genealogy, cultural and social Africanisms and African ancestry, that were in 
vogue in the 1970s and 1980s, had once again regained a higher profile with the 
advent of scientific advances such as genetic mapping.  At the time, Oprah was herself 
was preparing to launch the Oprah Leadership Academy in support for girls’ education 
in post-apartheid South Africa.  Adding an additional element of interest to the 
interview was the fact that months earlier, it had been revealed to Oprah Winfrey by 
Professor and Chair of the African American Studies program at Harvard University, 
Henry Louis Gates, that her most likely African ancestry was mostly likely a match 
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with the Kpelle ethnic group in Liberia.63  Johnson Sirleaf appeared on the Oprah 
Winfrey show on May 16, 2006 in Chicago, IL as part of a coordinated effort to push 
for investment and reconstruction assistance in the country.64  At the January inaugural 
she had taken the oath of office wearing African garb and a traditional headdress 
complimented by a single strand of pearls.  On the Oprah show, she used this same 
approach, appearing on the show impeccably dressed, genteel and representing a hint 
of Western style that seemingly reinforcing the message that a relationship between 
Liberia, African-Americans and the West could be constructive, linking Western or 
American engagement in Africa to a program of mutually beneficial, program of 
sustainable development.   
Speaking directly to Oprah’s national and international audiences, Johnson 
Sirleaf advocated for donations to the United States-based Liberian Education Trust 
(headed by Dr. Deborah Harding, former Vice President of the George Soros 
Foundation) and underlined the importance of girls’ education to Liberia’s economic 
recovery.  On the show, Johnson Sirleaf spoke of the challenges that women face in 
Liberia, and the need for early advocacy and intervention, particularly on behalf of the 
girls: 
“’In our country, as in much of Africa, the girls get left behind,’ she says. ‘The 
boys are seen as the ones that will be the power brokers, the ones that will be 
the professionals. Girls get married very early and so the emphasis will have to 
be on the girl child. And so we're trying to respond to that, make sure we get 
programs that will support girls' education.’"65 
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Johnson Sirleaf used this mantra of girls’ education to create inroads with the African 
American public, at a time when African American desire for African identity had 
again taken on a cross-cultural dimension with more and more African Americans 
seeking to solidify their ties to the continent.66 
As an outspoken advocate for repatriation, Johnson Sirleaf possessed a 
confidence and appeal that grew out of her own professional and educational 
development, as it much as from a desire to resolve pressing social problems at home.  
Johnson Sirleaf did not invent the concept of repatriation, but her grace, mannerisms 
and style have become an immutable aspect of her cross-cultural appeal.  She 
encouraged Liberians living in the United States to participate in either lobbying 
efforts to increase the amount of funds made available to the Liberian government or 
to return home to participate in the reconstruction of both the public and private 
sectors.  The efforts of Liberians and African Americans had created positive results 
once before.  Rhode Island Senator Lincoln Chafee (Republican) co-sponsored critical 
bi-partisan legislation with Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat) because of an 
ad hoc group of African American lobbyists called Liberia Watch.  Liberia Watch 
coordinated an effort to force the George W. Bush administration to intervene in 
Liberia. As a political figure, Johnson Sirleaf needed to reassure Liberians in the 
United States that Liberia was safe enough to return home, and, to those who by virtue 
of family or other obligations wished to stay in the U.S. that they could contribute by 
raising awareness and raising funds to donate to Johnson Sirleaf’s key presidential 
initiatives.  
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 New York Times reporter Helene Cooper, one of Liberia’s most famous, if not, 
by her own admission, unidentifiable members of the Liberian diaspora, reiterated 
Johnson Sirleaf’s message in her bestselling book, The House on Sugar Beach, 
published in 2008.  In The House on Sugar Beach she spoke of this urge not just to 
return “home” but also to return to the stability of pre-war Liberia. Cooper refers to an 
idyllic childhood as crucial to her continuing affection for Liberia.  She referred to that 
childhood, afforded to her by ancestor Elijah Johnson who repatriated to Liberia from 
New York in 1820, as akin to a “one-in-a-million lottery ticket… she didn’t have to 
grow up African American or a poor African girl.”67  Her only retelling of the 
colonial-like suffering endured by the nations indigenous people was reduced to what 
amounts to her family’s adoption and assimilation of a Bassa girl into her nuclear 
family and “Congo” lifestyle.  Not all members of the Liberian diaspora were as 
cavalier as Cooper in their articulation of “home,” given the longstanding societal 
divisions that historically have undermined the country’s stability.  Johnson Sirleaf 
engages the idea however that individuals returning to Liberia from the diaspora 
would be rewarded for doing so. 
Unprecedented as a congenial and hospitable African political figure, Johnson 
Sirleaf has a charm and confidence that translates equally well in both African and 
Western environs.  She has raised her international profile through public speaking 
engagements, headlining several commencement speeches in 2006.  She is sought 
after as a speaker and has spoken at institutions such as Spelman College, Brown 
University, Dartmouth University, Harvard University, University of the District of 
Columbia, University of Toronto, among others, to the delight of African American 
and white audiences alike.  In doing so, she is creating a framework for those who will 
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succeed her on how to become the “new” African president on the continent.  Critics 
such as Kofi Woods, a Liberian human rights activist, have complained that she 
spends too much time outside of Liberia rather than in the country, and as such is 
adopting a corporate leadership model.  It must be said, however, that her high profile 
among Western leaders and institutions seems to have had some positive impacts at 
home.  Several debt-holders, including the United States and Norway, have cancelled 
much of Liberia’s $3.7 billion debt, of which $358 million was held by the United 
States and amassed under the Taylor administration.68  Johnson Sirleaf is transforming 
the African presidency insofar as she is poised to become a household name in the 
United States as well as Africa.  In many places, Johnson Sirleaf has come to be 
known by her first name only, simply as Ellen.  Robtel Pailey, an-Oxford educated 
Scot Fellow, and current Special Assistant for Communications at the Liberian 
Executive Mansion explains the importance of the popularity Johnson Sirleaf enjoys.   
In an article she wrote for the Washington Informer, Pailey explains: the 67-year-old 
president, as the country’s new president “commands the same personable admiration 
as rock stars known by a single name – Madonna and Bono, for instance.”  Vivian 
Lowery Derryck of the Academic of Educational Development made a similar 
observation: “Children call her ‘President Ellen.’  So if I slip and call President Sirleaf 
‘Ellen,’ it’s with the same reverence and respect and the affection that I’ve seen the 
Liberian people and the international community shower on her.”69  Johnson Sirleaf’s 
continual naming and renaming is part of what has shaped her identity so definitively, 
showing that despite certain constants, her identity, to borrow Paul Gilroy’s concept, is 
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infinitely malleable: constantly changing, evolving and responding to different 
environmental conditions.  In Liberia’s postwar environment, that Liberia’s children 
address her as “Ellen,” or “President Ellen” signals that Johnson Sirleaf’s election 
ushers in an era of openness, freedom and democratic governance that can smooth 
ease the transition from warlords to peace.  
In her domestic appearances, away from and out of the international spotlight, 
Johnson Sirleaf transfigures herself as a Liberian “homegirl,” unafraid to engage 
directly with her constituents.  At one event on a Sunday afternoon, after attending 
Methodist Church service, “Ellen” donned sneakers and a baseball cap “as she 
dribbles a soccer ball across a soccer stadium, showing off some of the moves she 
learned as an 8-year-old girl on an all-boy soccer team.”70  This public appearance 
seemingly reinforced a consultative approach to developing the country that belied her 
many years of World Bank experience. She remarked of her approach to rebuilding 
the country, “Instead of telling them ‘We are going to build you a school,’ we ask 
them, ‘what is your priority?’”71  She insists that it is up to Liberians to decide for 
themselves what type of country they want to live in.  As a cultural figure she is 
dynamic, drawing attention to the activities that Liberians enjoy across age, gender, 
and ethnic lines.  
Johnson Sirleaf had both quiet and high profile support from Americo-
Liberians in exile that have chosen to transition back to life in Liberia.  Richard 
Tolbert- who is now Chair of the National Investment Commission – and nephew to 
the assassinated president, approved of the election: "By electing Africa's first female 
president, Liberia - Africa's first republic - has again taken its rightful place at the 
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vanguard of African liberation and democracy."72  In this repetition of repatriation 
rhetoric, Johnson Sirleaf’s election again put Liberia in the spotlight as Africa’s 
“exception,” a point of view that had been advanced by Richard Tolbert’s uncle and 
former president, William Tolbert.  Johnson Sirleaf was the first to proclaim that her 
gender made her uniquely qualified for the presidency.  For other constituencies, 
among them the country’s youth who Weah had erroneously declared “would never 
follow that old woman,”73 the gender discussion became one for all ages and 
generations.  It was this youth population that despite having rallied to elect an 
“internationalist” president, would complain that in Johnson Sirleaf’s early days in the 
office, that she never spent enough time in Liberia. 
During her first twelve months in office, she forced international donors to 
make good on the financial pledges made during the 2005 and 2007 international 
donor conferences.  In order to implement her development agenda and stabilize the 
country, Johnson Sirleaf needed outside resources to make good on campaign 
promises such as road construction and electrification projects.  U.S. leaders assured 
her that she could continue to look to them for support.  Nancy Pelosi, during Johnson 
Sirleaf’s 2006 visit to Washington, DC, promised that the United States would make 
good on its promise to support her administration, saying, “You have electrified the 
world -- we will electrify Monrovia."74  From the outset, Johnson Sirleaf used her 
international recognition and popularity to execute critical campaign promises.  
Liberians, while slightly pacified by the election, were still easily riled, due partially 
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by George Weah’s continued presence but also because of a fear that they would be 
left out of the conversation on the emerging national identity.  
“What the U.S. Owes Liberia” 
 In order to critique Johnson Sirleaf’s approach to the reconstruction of Liberia, 
one might look no further than an article that Johnson Sirleaf wrote and published in 
the New York Times on August 11, 2003 entitled, “What the U.S. Owes Liberia”75 to 
know that she sees the U.S. as a third-party guarantor of Liberian freedoms and its 
sovereignty.  The agenda that brought U.S. intervention as part of what it “owes” to 
Liberia according to Johnson Sirleaf’s article, also meant that it had a large stake in 
how the country was rebuilt.  Johnson Sirleaf’s conception of repatriation, and her 
promotion of it, combined a desire for world-class professional skills along with a 
high valuation of Western work ethic, transparency and business practices – though 
Johnson Sirleaf unlike anyone that came before her conceives of repatriation as a 
patriotic duty, a way for Liberians who had avoided the physical and psychological 
scars of the war could return as part of a reconstruction effort.  Jacques Klein’s 
(U.N.M.I.L. Special Representative) hurried departure from Monrovia in 2004, one 
year short of the full term of his contract, amid a political scandal seems to give 
legitimacy to her argument that Liberians could do no worse than the international 
representatives that expected to serve them.  
Johnson Sirleaf’s efforts to refine the diaspora’s reconstruction efforts begin 
with her own inner circle of repatriated talent.  For his efforts, campaign manager 
Amara Konneh, was sent to Harvard to attend the one-year Masters in Public Policy 
program, he recently returned (in 2008) to a promotion: he is now the Minister of 
Planning and Economic Affairs.  Amara Konneh, became a confidante of Johnson 
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Sirleaf’s after moving to the United States in the 1990s when his ethnic group was 
targeted during the Liberian civil war.  He founded Liberians for Ellen, or L.I.F.E. 
(which in 2004, before campaigning was allowed inside Liberia), a consortium of 
Liberian residents in the United States, who raised funds and awareness for her 
campaign in the United States.   
Johnson Sirleaf has also made inroads with high-profile African American 
business people.  Billionaire financier, Bob Johnson, Black Entertainment Television 
(B.E.T.) founder, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Delta Air Lines recently announced that it 
would introduce the first “and only flight between Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport and Monrovia’s Robertsfield International Airport,”76 the flight 
would make one stop in Cape Verde before continuing on to Monrovia to begin in 
June 2009.  This is a landmark moment because it makes the goal of repatriation easier 
to orchestrate: before this flight was announced, choices were limited to European 
carriers or U.N. charter flights.  The Robertsfield international airport had struggled 
for years and recently was able to meet Federal Aviation Administration standards for 
baggage screening, making it able to attract an American airline.  The strength of this 
airline partnership seems to be predicated on establishing a long-lasting relationship 
with the African American diaspora, particularly black American businesspeople 
looking for opportunities to invest in Liberia.  Liberians living in America also benefit 
because it makes it easier for them to continue to have their feet in “both worlds.”  
Again, at a National Press Club briefing, she repeated this mantra, speaking forcefully 
about of how important the direct flight would be to Liberia, because of the increased 
mobility it could afford to returnees. She said, “This development also provides 
convenience for Liberians in Diaspora to come home and to bring their skills and 
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talents in support of the country's development.”77  The Delta airlines flight was 
reminiscent of the now defunct direct Pan Am flight from New York City to Monrovia 
that was a well-worn path allowing well-to-do Monrovians to shuttle back and forth to 
New York City often for business or shopping excursions in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Monrovia had once been a haven for black celebrities, providing a respite from 
American racism. Luminaries such as Nina Simone, Ruby Dee and Ossie Davis (who 
was stationed in Liberia during World War II) frequented Monrovia and its pristine 
beaches.  Ossie Davis’ reflections on Liberia in the 1940s identified the impeding 
class conflict.  The impact of black colonialism so affected him that he wrote about the 
experience in his memoirs:  
"The Americo-Liberians, black though they were, tended to live like 
Europeans or Americans, and that surprised me. They had new cars; they 
regularly sent their children off to Europe or America to college, and they 
fraternized with their peers at Firestone. They seldom mixed with the natives, 
with whom I had already bonded, who were authentic Africans and much more 
fun. I was not only uneasy with the class conflict I felt was brewing in Liberia, 
I was disturbed by it. But most of the soldiers on the post were not. They, too, 
quite easily, took to treating all the natives, not as brothers and comrades, but 
like servants, in much the same way white folks treated black folks down in 
Georgia.”78 
What Ossie Davis described was a type of imperialism that has continued unabated 
without serious challenge.  Despite the efforts of past presidents to develop the 
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country’s interior, including President Tubman’s national Unification Policy in the 
1950s, followed by President Tolbert’s “from mats to mattresses” and “Total 
Involvement for Higher Heights” in the 1970s, even the most progressive of Liberia’s 
past presidents were more immersed in rhetoric than reality. 
The Delta airlines flight also facilitates Bob Johnson’s future investments in 
Liberia that include a large resort hotel on the coast located in the heart of the Kendeja 
Liberian cultural reserve slated to open in March 2009.  The resort, which already 
plans to host delegates attending the 2009 International Colloquium of Women 
Leaders, “including President Tarja Halonen of Finland and President Sirleaf herself - 
will be the first of what Bob Johnson believes will be a steady stream of guests, 
including United Nations personnel, NGO workers and government officials.  Bob 
Johnson also believes that Kendeja will be a favorite among wealthy Liberians.”79  
Johnson Sirleaf is facilitating business investments in Kendeja, the national cultural 
resort founded in 1964 is located on the Atlantic Ocean coastline and continues to be 
home to the National Cultural Dance Troupe that is composed of performing artists 
selected from Liberia’s major ethnic groups.80  With these recent developments, 
Johnson Sirleaf’s travels to the United States, to build relationships with wealthy 
African Americans appear to be paying dividends.   
 Richard Tolbert, a former Wall Street Investment banker, facilitated the Bob 
Johnson - Kendeja deal.81 The National Investment Commission that Tolbert heads 
handles mineral trading with Russia, the United States and Israel (trading iron ore, 
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gold and diamonds) as well as to the business investment climate in Liberia.  Tolbert 
explains his Wall Street ties, as well as the nature of his professional relationship with 
Johnson Sirleaf in a 2008 interview: 
“I am a Liberian by birth. I had to leave when the war came in 1980, because 
my family was a political and business family. We had the biggest business in 
the country which employed up to 6,000 employees before the war. It was a 
company that worth more than 15 million dollars. I went to work on Wall 
Street for 25 years. I am a private banker by training, a lawyer and an 
economist. I went to Harvard. The President, who is older than me, and I went 
there together. I resigned two weeks after she was elected because I know that 
she has the leadership that can turn this country around. I came to help fix this 
country. This is my home I have a duty to come back home and help once I 
believe in the leadership. The time is rough, but the key thing about our leader 
is that she has been able to assemble a team of professionals around her. I 
believe in her vision and I want to see it carry on.”82  
This is a remarkably reflective statement from a man whose uncle, the last Americo-
Liberian president, had been killed as a result of settler tensions between Americo-
Liberian and indigenous people.  But perhaps it is not so surprising if one considers 
that, for all of the difficulties within the Liberian state, he was decidedly shaped by his 
experiences as a member of the Americo-Liberian elite.  Tolbert’s vision of returning 
home, takes on the tenor of “noblesse oblige,” in which he feels that the reconstruction 
effort, and special invitation from Johnson Sirleaf proves that Liberia cannot survive 
without its middle class.  Tolbert advances an opinion of Liberian reconstruction that 
had originated with Hegelian rhetoric of “the dark continent,” and that African 
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American leadership would provide the “shining light” on the continent such that the 
Liberian state would be a model for other African leaders to follow.  In later 
interviews, he elaborated on this point, saying, “by electing Africa's first female 
president, Liberia - Africa's first republic - has again taken its rightful place at the 
vanguard of African liberation and democracy.”83  With Tolbert driving the country’s 
development industry, sitting at the helm of Liberia’s extractive industries including 
iron ore, gold and diamond mining, lies an additional problematic because his political 
and economic philosophy seemingly suggest that the country’s elites alone will benefit 
from development, thus contributing to problems of underdevelopment within the 
country’s interior.   
Tolbert himself has lived a life of privilege both in Liberia and in the United 
States working, like Johnson Sirleaf, in the banking industry.  From 1980-1998, he 
was a Vice President with Merrill Lynch.  Later, he went on to become Senior Vice 
President of PaineWebber Inc., one of America's largest investment houses and is 
responsible for developing international business, especially in Africa.  He is a 
member of the Corporate Council on Africa, based in Washington, DC and African 
Business Roundtable, based in Johannesburg.  Despite the fact that he is well 
credentialed, he is advocating top-down development approach that without 
government policies offering job training and education to Liberia’s war affected 
youth, will continue to exacerbate existing inequality. 
 Despite the fact that Johnson Sirleaf has had access to a world-class education, 
in key cultural moments, Johnson Sirleaf is too involved in the promotion of capitalist 
values and neoliberal practices, to critique the offensive ideological underpinnings of 
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repatriation rhetoric.  The Tolbert appointment itself is problematic because Johnson 
Sirleaf’s over-reliance upon repatriated Americo-Liberians for political and economic 
talent undermines indigenous leadership and talent.  This is a trend, reminiscent of the 
original Americo-Liberian intrusion in West Africa when Americo-Liberians were 
given carte blanche created one of the continent’s most repressive economic systems 
on the continent.  During Johnson Sirleaf’s frequent visits to the U.S. she often stops 
in Washington, DC to visit with her mentor and friend Stephen Cashin, who helped 
raise funds for Johnson Sirleaf’s campaign; he also serves as her economic advisor.  
Cashin, President of Pan African Capital Group is now planning to open an office in 
Liberia.84  Johnson Sirleaf’s use of repatriation rhetoric is merely a guise for a process 
of recapitalizing Monrovia with foreign investments.  By placing “Congo” people 
such as Tolbert in key areas in order to facilitate opportunities for outside investment, 
she is building bridge between Western imperial interests and cheap African labor, 
through which Liberian’s Congo people are the conduits for the exploitation of 
Liberia’s poor, which throughout the country’s history has traditionally the role of the 
“Congo” bourgeoisie. 
 Not only is the country becoming capitalized by Western interests, and staffed 
by Western talent, it is also becoming increasingly militarized.  Johnson Sirleaf’s 
broke with the African Union by offering Liberia as a cite for African Command, or 
AFRICOM, a project that would allow the U.S. to coordinate its military, diplomatic 
and humanitarian assistance programs from one central location.  Johnson Sirleaf’s 
willingness to play host to AFRICOM, reveals that she is more closely allied to the 
United States than the countries in her region that resisted this effort as a 
“neocolonial” intrusion.  Bob Johnson took to the Washington Post in an Op-Ed page 
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to forcefully urge Johnson Sirleaf to host the base and the U.S. to assist her in creating 
the infrastructure to support it. In the article, he argues that the role played by the 
Jewish American lobby as a model that African Americans should emulate.  He also 
links the country’s militarization as a necessary part of securing his and other private 
corporate investment assets: 
Promoting U.S. investment in Liberia should be another priority. In many 
sectors, Liberia has world-class natural resources. Under an agreement ratified 
a week ago, Mittal Steel will invest more than $1 billion to extract iron ore 
from northern Liberia. Firestone, which has been in the country for 80 years, is 
working to significantly increase its rubber production. Other opportunities 
exist in timber, mining and infrastructure development….  Liberia deserves 
American support, and African Americans especially must come forward to 
reestablish the historic bond between our nations. The Sirleaf government is 
working tirelessly to create a better and more prosperous future for citizens. 
We bear a special responsibility to ensure that she succeeds.85 
Johnson again links, as Johnson Sirleaf had earlier, the importance of the diasporic 
influence in Liberia to the country’s development, economic and political stability. 
Johnson Sirleaf followed up one month later in an editorial that she wrote 
herself and published on Allafrica.com (Bob Johnson sits on the Board of Directors) 
reiterating his main argument.  The article called, “Africa: Africom Can Help 
Governments Willing to Help Themselves,” supports the perspective that capital 
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growth and military security in Liberia are mutually dependent.86  Johnson Sirleaf 
advances and uses the “personal responsibility” rhetoric that Africans bear the 
responsibility for their own development and/ or underdevelopment.  This is a point of 
view that has been vigorously refuted by leading Liberian academics including Emira 
Woods of Institute for Policy Studies (I.P.S.) and Ezekiel Pajibo a journalist and 
human rights advocate responded a month later Foreign Policy in Focus, the think tank 
where Emira Woods (a Harvard graduate herself) works that publishes the leading 
publication by the same name.  Together they used the occasion of Liberian 
Independence Day (July 26, 2007) to argue that militarization has led to less, and not 
more stability in Liberia:   
“Liberia's 26-year descent into chaos started when the Reagan administration 
prioritized military engagement and funneled military hardware, training, and 
financing to the regime of the ruthless dictator Samuel K. Doe. This military 
‘aid,’ seen as ‘soft power’ at that time, built the machinery of repression that 
led to the deaths of an estimated 250,000 Liberians. Basing AFRICOM in 
Liberia will put Liberians at risk now and into the future. Liberia’s national 
threat level will dramatically increase, as the country becomes a target of those 
interested in attacking U.S. assets. This will severely jeopardize Liberia’s 
national security interests while creating new problems for the country’s 
fragile peace and its nascent democracy.”87 
Woods and Pajibo link the decline of Liberia into a 26 year war and the advent of Cold 
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War politics to the prevailing logic that advanced by the U.S. agencies that “failed,” or 
“failing,” states could become havens of terrorist activity.  The Liberian intervention 
became that much more important because of the fact that Charles Taylor’s 
administration had been linked to Al Qaeda network.88  The AFRICOM quagmire 
dissolved despite the fact that Johnson Sirleaf never opposed it (it is now hosted by 
Germany instead) seems to point to a critical crack in Johnson Sirleaf’s seemingly 
impenetrable veneer.  It is the same divide that proved disastrous for the regimes led 
by Charles Taylor, Samuel Doe and even William Tolbert.   
 The Ellen Johnson Sirleaf administration as in the governments that preceded 
her, the leadership philosophy possesses the same “fatal flaw,” continuing to repeat 
the same mistake of catering to Western interests at the expense of developing or 
challenging the prevailing statist-centered developmental epistemology.  Liberia’s 
current and past instability continues to be predicated upon a fundamental cultural 
problem and identity crisis: whether or not the Americo-Liberia leadership are 
Africans or see themselves as Americans.  While Ellen Johnson Sirleaf speaks with 
the voice of a modern Africa, that voice alone is not “postcolonial”, or even 
reminiscent of a postwar consciousness.   Is Johnson Sirleaf, and the belated 
postcoloniality that she it embodies a sign of Africa’s future or more reminiscent of its 
past? 
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